Showing posts with label Polish Mountain Infantry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Polish Mountain Infantry. Show all posts

Thursday, 31 August 2017

Stanislaw Maczek - Part 7 - The End of World War 2, Betrayal and Exile (1944-1994)



1st Polish Armoured Division in Normandy
As the resolution of the Normandy campaign began to set in for the Poles they came to realise that they would find it a massive struggle to be able to make good the losses sustained in Normandy, meanwhile geo-politics were to decide the fate of Maczek and his men who would be left behind by events. Even in September '44 their future didnt look as bleak as it was to become. Stalin's European ambitions were starting to become clear to the Polish army in exile in 1944 although many still believed that they would still be able to return to the land of their birth.




A Stuart light tank in Normandy
Maczek's immediate problem was how to maintain an operational division in the field whilst almost 2000 men below establishment. He was worried most of all about the Division being halted at the Somme area and stood down. He mulled over the numbers and considered a number of actions including amalgamating his armoured troops from four troops to three and using them for armoured reconnaissance.  The reconnaissance regiments were to have their US supplied Stuart light tanks replaced with White Scout Cars whilst the anti aircraft platoons throughout the division were to be abolished with the manpower subsequently being moved over to the infantry in light of the Luftwaffe's evaporation.

A British Staff report also took the Polish losses seriously and made recognition of the fact that the Canadians were now having to actively support the Poles in the field. They opted to leave events to play out to see how the Poles coped with the issues before the next phase of operations around the Somme area kicked off which gave the Poles about three weeks breathing space.

Allied soldiers with a liberated Ostruppen
Losses were being made good actually but sadly the replacements were coming in slower than hoped. 350 men came in the week beginning 28th August with a further 700 being made available over the next three weeks. There were also replacements coming from the German Ostruppen POW's who couldnt wait to change uniforms, although Brigadier Lloyd was insistent that these turncoats needed to go through a screening process before being fully integrated into the Polish armed forces.


Of course, a further complication was the training that these men required in order to fall into step with the 1st PAD effectively.

Polish Radio Operator 1944
Maczek raised his concerns with the Polish Army Staff but nothing appeared to be solvable and the lack of experienced recruits available came home to roost in November of '44 when the 1st Armoured Division received an official reprimand from Army Group over the lax security measures that the 1st PAD were seen to be employing in the Divisional Wireless Net. This included messages being transmitted in native Polish as opposed to being broadcast in code. This was unforgiveable because even if the Polish struggled to speak English, there was certainly no shortage of Germans who spoke Polish and even Poles who were still willing to work alongside the Nazi state.


An infantry patrol in France 1944
Maczek was also concerned with the amateur nature of the replacements he was receiving that were supposed to be making good his losses. This was brought home by the results of slack patrolling after the enemy had successfully raided the southern bank of the Maas where the 1st PAD were stationed. It was considered that Polish patrols acted inappropriately when meeting German patrols; they panicked. Patrol reports were incomplete and frequently arrived at unwarranted conclusions instead of using accurate facts to deduce results.



It was resolved that defences needed to be beefed up, patrolling should be intensified and more rigorous checking of patrol reports was to be made mandatory.

Maczek and Crerar
It wasnt all grim however, Crerar (OiC of Canadian 1st Army) wrote of the Poles in Maple Leaf on 1st November 1944 that '...during recent weeks the Poles have been fighting under extremely difficult conditions, and have established an outstanding reputation by their accomplishments... Every demand ever made on these troops has been met. Every task has been complted, no matter how bitter the enemys defences or how unsavoury the natural conditions. With such officers and men military success and final victory can never be in doubt... in all the fighting of the 1st Canadian Army during the last three months the Polish troops have set the finest of military standards'. Truly amazing words considering the hostile attitude towards the Poles that the Canadian military hierarchy harboured a mere three months earlier.

Following the Falaise dust up the Poles claimed that they were ready to fight again within a week. Casualties would have their effect however. Infantry companies were now below 100 men and the tank companies now had three platoons instead of the four... but despite this, by 31st August the Division crossed the River Dives via the 'Warsaw Bridge' and gave chase to the enemy.


The 1st Polish Armoured Divisions liberation route...


Abbeville as it appeared in 1944
One of the most important tasks of the 1st PAD was to locate and secure bridges over water obstacles. Corps had received word of an intact bridge in the Abbeville area although on moving towards the target area Reconnaissance reported that the bridge had been blown. This was 11:30 on 2nd September 1944. By 17:15 hours Polish sappers had built a bridge under fire and 3rd Rifle Brigade had stormed the river and forced a crossing.





They chased the Germans into Belgium where on 12th September they liberated Ghent then turning north clearing the countryside north of Germans to the Scheldt Estuary.

Polish armour with a bit of R&R before crossing into Holland
By the end of September  '44 they were preparing to move into their assembly area prior to the invasion of the Netherlands. After the fighting in the thick and choking environment of Normandy the Division now found itself in totally unfamiliar surroundings. Flat wetlands, frequently flooded and criss-crossed with canals for the most part bereft of bridges and what bridges there were, being bitterly defended by the Germans.





It was during this wet and marshy autumn and winter that the Division started to show absolutely superb cooperation between the Armour, Infantry and Sappers. The heroism of the Polish sappers should be a matter for historical record. They were frequently called upon to cross heavily defended watercourses and required to throw up bridges and construct fords all under furious defensive fire so that the armour and infantry could get across and continue the advance.

Casualties remained high however with Zgorzelski of the 10th Dragoons sending a battle report to Maczek following a crossing of the Axel Canal on 22nd September where he had to report the loss of 106 men in one day including 4 officers. However Maczek also reports that morale remained high amongst the men on account of the level of success that they were achieving despite the losses.

Throughout October 1944 the 1st Polish Armoured Division was engaged in this tooth and nail war of overcoming obastacles. Always well prepared for defense by the Germans, gains were always accompanied with a significant loss of men.

The Poles liberate Breda...

A Polish dispatch rider reaches Breda
30th October saw Maczek achieve one of his proudest triumphs. The capture of the city of Breda and more importantly to the civiilian population; the manner in which he captured it.




As Captain Stanislaw Grabowski oberved 'there were two ways that they had available to them. Monty's way which involved laying on an aerial bombardment of the town and then a blitz assault or shelling it and then blitz it or there was General Maczeks way which was to encircle the town and then there was a chance that street fighting could be avoided, thus he gained reknown amongst the civilian population'.


8th Infantry Brigade being greeted by the Dutch at Breda
Captain Tadeusz Wielgorski of 2nd Armoured Regiment observed something similar saying that when they were capturing Breda all of the regiments and their tanks could have fired and caused complete devastation. They did not, and that was why Breda 'greeted us so warmly'.



After passing Breda they turned north chasing the Germans until they had them trapped against the waters of the Hollandsche Diep. This unfolded into a 10 day battle, including the crossing of the Mark Canal, once again in the teeth of strenuous resistance finally culminating with the capture of Moerdijk on the coast.




In mid November 1944 the 1st Polish Armoured Division was given its first proper chance to rest, with its headquarters situated in Breda. During this period of R&R the Divisional staff had a chance to take stock of where they actually were.

The losses so to speak, and my oh my, were they sobering figures.

Brigadier General Stanislaw Maczek with Breda's Burgemeester Van Slobbe (and some other punkah wallah in uniform!)

Treating a victim of sniper fire on the battlefield
For the period of 8th August to 15th November they had lost 4,478 killed, wounded or missing, including 291 officers. Amazingly only five men had been captured by the Germans since Falaise which would suggest something of the stubborn nature of the Poles, but also may reflect the speed at which the axis forces were moving backwards. The ten week chase across the low countries had cost them 3,038 casualties with the infantry bearing the 63% brunt of the casualties and the armour next on the list with 16.25%. In addition to all of this there was a high percentage of hospitalised cases with 56 officers and a further 1,237 men.

This brought the casualties to a grand total of 5,771 men. There were a further 1,773 officers and men who were sick but who had returned to the regiments, albeit maybe not all to front line duty. It makes you wonder just who was left doing the fighting.

Polish armour moving across wide open spaces
At the beginning of the Low Country Pursuit on 9th September 1944, the strength of the Division was 736 officers and 11,950 men. This was gradually boosted by replacements from the UK  and Maczek, with the agreement of General Kopanski, the Chief of the Polish Staff agreed on setting a target of 15th February to have the Division back up to strength and combat ready. Maczek also agreed to leave the Division available for operations throughout this period of reinforcement. By the end of March 1945 the Division had received 58 officers and 4,496 men as replacements. All material shortages were made good as well which given the size of the small size of the organic permanent training staff was an incredible feat.



It was during this winter break however that many of the Poles eventually found the time again to sit down and consider what was happening in the world around them and their place in it.

Meanwhile at Yalta Roosevelt says:
"Gentlemen, lets share the world..."
It was at this time that Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin all met at Yalta in the Middle East, purposefully excluding Poland from being invited to contribute on the discussion relating to their own future. The Yalta Conference has come to be seen as big a stab in the back for an ally that had fought, bled and died alongside us for our freedoms as that of Munich in 1938 where we left Czechoslovakia to be torn apart by the Nazis giving us 'Peace in our time' (Really?).

Whilst at Yalta, East and Central Europe were to all intents and purposes handed over to the Communists with Churchill aparently being quite ebullient about allowing the communists to expand their area of influence. Once again Anthony Eden, our man of the hour, stepped in to voice his concern about the voraciously aquisitive nature of Stalin and the Communist Regime. He categorically refused to believe that they would behave well to the new populations within their expanded sphere, merely wanting to expand their reach and most definitely at the expense of absolutely anybody who got in their way.

One of the plenary sessions at Yalta 1945
At seven of the eight plenary sessions at Yalta, Poland was the subject. Stalin and his cronies were absolutely adamant that Poland should be made strong again but only under Communist guidance and that she should be well compensated from Germanys eastern territories for her own loss of territory although what Poland gained in no way made up for the massive area of land that she had lost to the Soviet invasion of '39. It was already clear by '43 that Stalin never intended to return any of the Polish territories and had already quite systematically brutalised the population with massive programs of deportations to the east having already been undertaken... and lets not forget the Katyn atrocities.

Anders was not amused!
The Western powers were quite simply outmanoeuvred at Yalta by Stalin, and left desperately trying to make an absolute ass kicking look like some sort of moral victory for the Polish people... that is, until General Anders heard the results. He quite abruptly stated to Chnurchill that 'Yalta is the end of Poland!'

Maczek found himself considering the situation. The new Polish borders were to follow the Curzon Line which was the orignal British ideas for the Polish borders in 1918, but his home, Lwow would no longer  be Polish. He considered the death camps of Oswiecim (Auschwitz-Birkenau) and Dachau and the expulsion of the Nazi abomination from the homeland and was left wondering if the Nazis really were really still the main enemy. He wondered if he could even return home at all?

True to form though, he rejected all personal concerns and opinions and stated that 'a soldier should not speak of his fate or his future, no matter how hard or unfair it might be' Nevertheless it should also be pointed out here that the Foreign Office was acutely aware of how unhappy Maczek was with the high handed attitude that Anders was displaying towards wartime military/politics and in a wholly unusual departure for Maczek was openly critical of him.

The Poles staged at Hengelo prepare to cross the border into Germany...
There was one last episode to be played out before the Divsion's final battle and the war drew to a close and in April '45 the Division was moved 150 miles from Breda to the area of Hengelo in preparation for a new offensive. Once again they had to cross water obstacles under fire and were preparing to do so when an urgent request reached them.




It was revealed that at nearby Niederlangen there was a womans detention camp which contained women of the Armia Krajowe, captured during the Warsaw Uprising of '44. There was a concern that the nazis may try to use the women as some sort of diversionary tactic and so High Command deemed it essential that an armoured platoon be sent to the camp to liberate them.

Maczek with some of the liberated
women of Warsaw's Armia Krajowa
A platoon from 3rd Squadron, 10th Mounted Rifles was sent to the camp. The woman were set to jump over the moon when they realised that what they thought were English soldiers were actually Polish troops. One woman known simply as Mieczyslawa lauded her liberation from Stalag VI C Oberlangen by the 10th Mounted Rifles troops. Once the women heard the soldiers speak they realised that they were Polish; the most important thing for the women was to make sure that the soldiers spoke to them in Polish. It is an interesting note that one woman who was liberated wrote to Baca (this means The Good Shepherd, and its one of Maczeks nicknames that his troops bestowed on him) on his 100th birthday still thanking him for liberating her. The women displayed their military discipline and fortitude when General Maczek later arrived at the camp and the women formally paraded with their commanding officer; Lieutenant 'Jaga' Milewska of the Polish Home Army making her formal report that 1,726 women, soldiers of the Home Army in Stalag VI C Oberlangen were reporting for duty.

The fate of the failed uprising was brought into stark and ugly focus on that day.

Polish armour a bit stuck in the mud!
On the 19th April 1945 the Division breached its final water obstacle, the Kusten Canal and reached its final objective of the war; Wilmhelmshaven. Typically of Maczek he delayed the action for as long as possible in order to bring as much firepower to bear as possible without causing excessive casualties.




On 4th May the 10th Mounted Rifles and 8th Rifle Battalion halted at the outer rings of the Wilmhelmshaven defences and in the evening called in artillery support in order to open up a passage into the town but a signal had been received that an armistice had been arranged for 08:00 the next morning, 5th May 1945.

The artillery opened up and continued without pause until 07:59.

The destroyed Wilmhelmshaven docks after the capitulation in 1945

In their final offensive operations in Germany the Division had lost a further 600 men and officers but had taken 5000 prisoners and an enormous amount of materials.

Mazcek described the end of the war and the taking of the German surrender in Ostfriesland at the HQ of II Canadian Corps at Bad Zwischenahn. He recalled how in a large empty room General Guy Simonds sat behind a long table with his Chief of Staff and Divisional Commanders. No seats for the Germans indicated the hostility of the reception that they were to receive.

General Erich Straube
Six German officers entered the room; General Erich Straube, CO of the 1st Parachute Army between the rivers Ems and Weser. He was accompanied by the commanding officer of the local units of Kriegsmarine (German Navy), his Chief of Staff and three officers in charge of areas in Ostfriesland. They entered and stood to attention. Maczek considered the difference between these men and those that were captured on the field of conflict. Whereas those men were raw and exhibiting all manner of emotions, covered in dirt and dust, these men in front of him were stiff, formal and masked. They could be concealing everything or nothing.



Straube began to speak but Simonds cut him off immediately stating that he had not come here to negotiate but to listen to Simonds and accept an unconditional surrender with absolutely non-negotiable terms. Simonds read the list in a hard edged and clear voice.

The Polish flag is raised
Maczek drifted back to 1939 and considered how General Kutrzeba must have felt surrending Warsaw to the Nazi animals when he was brought back to the room by Simonds busy allocating the German areas to different Canadian organisations. Simonds had allocated the 1st Polish Armoured Division to occupy Wilhelmshaven and disarm the garrison. Hearing that a Polish formation would be the occuping force caused the German officers to grimace and from studiously avoiding looking at him, they finally had to confront Maczek sitting there in his uniform emblazoned with Polish insignia.

In a quaint turn of phrase Maczek recorded in his diary that "surely it wasnt necessary to remind them that they had unleashed this dreadful war with the attack on Poland and in the presence of one of the few Polish units still fighting they were now laying down their arms"



The 1st Polish Armoured Division, fighting in Germany, was to occupy a part of Germany. Maczek was left wondering whether or not this must have been the first time in history that this must have happened?

Surrendered German U-Boats in 1945
The haul in Wilmhelmshaven was incredible. Tens of thousands of prisoners including two Admirals and a General were taken. The quantity of captured equipment was truly astronomical; 3 cruisers, 18 submarines, 205 minor warships and support vessels, 94 fortress guns, 159 field guns, 560 machine guns, 40,000 rifles, 280,000 artillery shells and 64 million rounds of small arms ammunition. In addition to this there were stores of mines, torpedos as well as supplies of food for 50,000 men for a period of 6 months.

Even if the war had ended on a high for General Maczek and his indefatigable Polish warriors, peace was to prove a grave disappointment as wartime alliances were quickly forgotten.

Maczek back in Scotland and surrounded again...
The first signs of things not going the way they were expected to was received by Maczek a mere two weeks after the occupation of Wilmhelmshaven when he was recalled to Scotland in order to take command of the I Polish Corps. Being a smart guy he probably saw the way the wind was blowing.

What he probably couldnt have anticipated however was being stripped of his citizenship on 6th September 1946 by the Polish Communist puppet government along with a list of another 75 senior Polish officers for taking up arms under and accepting orders from another foreign power.

For the rest of his life Maczek would refuse to recognise the Polish Peoples Republic as anything other than a puppet state jiggling on Communist strings.

Polish President Jaruzelski
After years of misdeeds, once the Communist regime in Poland began to falter, the illegal Jaruzelski regime began to try to use Maczeks name and deeds as a part of their damage control utilising the idea of the Polish soldier, no matter where they were or where they served as the saviours of the nation. McGilvray raises the possibility that this was possibly just one old soldier simply reaching out to another but Maczek stoutly refused to respond to these overtures quite rightly seeing them as nothing more than an attempt to link his name and the Second Republic, which he proudly represented to the corrupt and illegal communist controlled regime that dominated Poland between 1944 and 1989.



Without starting up a long text driven debate concerning the Polish place in the UK after the war it can be said with some justification that the UK government were a bunch of gutless weasles with yellow streaks wider than the San Andreas Fault who continued the long English tradition of abandoning our allies when they have needed us the most unless our own pockets were being hit and the actions of the Communists in Poland were for the most part brushed as far under the carpet as could be managed.

It was apparently quite clear to many of the Poles what the situation in Poland would likely be if they were able to return to their homeland after 1945. Maczek did not desire to return to  Poland under those circumstances and it was with some sorrow that he held his final meeting with Colonel Dec and his future, possibly in Poland.

Franciszek Skibinski early and late in life. 
Relationships with Franciszek Skibinski had unfortunately soured remarkably however, as he had apparently embraced the ideas of Communism and had decided to return to Poland. Maczek was of the opinion that Skibinski was being opportunistic seeking to further his career, even if under the Communists. Skibinski would return to Poland, but within a year was arrested and tortured including having all of his teeth knocked out. When a more progressive form of Communism was able to supplant the Stalinist paraoia in 1956 Skibinski was quietly released and made a General.


The decision to deprive Maczek of his citizenship was overturned in 1971 but as it was the government of the Polish Peoples Republic making the decree, and therefore a Communist vassal Maczek ignored the decree. It was not until the fall of Communism in Poland in 1989 that Maczek accepted the gesture.

Lieutenant Jan Suchcitz, one of the veterans of the 10th Mounted Rifles, reflected that in the remaining 50 years of Maczeks life he never sought any accolades, was always a firm believer in an apolitical army and took no part in the political folly that had riven the Polish army for so many years.

The Virtuti Militari
Maczek did occasionally sally forth into the political arena however and was, in 1961 openly critical of the manner in which the highest Polish military accolade, the Virtuti Militari, was awarded for the September Campaign. For a campaign of such monumental failure he was of the opinion that far too many had been subsequently awarded. Again in 1961, in a letter to General Grudzinski he was critical of the mass awarding of the medal.

In contrast to some, such as General Anders, Maczek was to remain employed in humble jobs in order to support his family in Edinburgh. He received no pension from either the british or canadian government (and yes the respective governments deserve no capitalisation in this regard!) and it was only the appreciation and generosity of the Dutch people that facilitated a secure future for the Maczeks disabled daughter.

It was reported in the Polish Press in London in 1995 that Maczek did eventually receive a generous pension from the Dutch government. No doubt this was connected to the Polish liberation of Breda and Maczek being instrumental in its liberation without destruction.

The bar in the Learmont Hotel that Mr Maczek worked in
This was a sadly belated honour however as Mr Stanislaw Maczek, as he preferred to be known after the war, had to find work as a Barman and later on as a shop assistant, right up to the end of the 1960's in order to support his family. Despite these setbacks however, he was never a downhearted person. He was always attentive to his Divisions former members, always attended reunions and commemorations and he always gladly welcomed visits from his former subordinates.


The problem of senior Polish officers gaining employment in the UK after the war was one that was to haunt Maczek for the rest of his days in exile and was ironically, by association, the reason for being stripped of his Polish citizenship.


Following the surrender of Germany a census of Poles serving under Western Command was taken in the wake of the news that Poland was being handed to the tender mercies of the Communists and a total of only 17.2% were happy to return. The underlying problem with this was that the majority of the British public had, given the enormous suffering that the Soviet Union had suffered through the war, a healthy sympathy for the communist people and their politicians. Ever the slaves to public passions, the home government also had a significant distrust of Anders rabidly anti communist rhetoric and that of other members of the Polish II Corps, believing that it would likely result in political complications if left unchecked, much less actually fostered and accepted.

One of the PRC camps
Finally, the British government came up with an idea of how to discharge all of the serving Polish troops. The Polish Armed Forces (Repatriation and Resettlement Scheme), which was a vehicle by which Poles could be moved from the military either into local civilian life or even back to Poland, was established. For those that chose to remain in the U.K the Poles established the Polish Resettlement Corps (PRC). It was established to serve as a sort of halfway house in which discharged Poles could be prepared for life in the West.


An example of a Polish Resettlement Corp registration book
It was the establishment of the PRC that was to prove so problematic for the Poles as it caused tremendous anger within Communist ranks, both in Moscow and its new vassal states. The Soviets decided that any members of the PRC had taken military service under a foreign government which was actually categorically untrue. Despite the uniforms being worn the organisation was a civilian operation.

Commie puppet Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski
The new Polish puppet Defence Minister, Marshal Zymierski had broadcast the message that anybody enlisting in the PRC would be stripped of their citizenship despite the fact that it was non military, as well as being both a logical and pragmatic step in the transition to civilian life in Great Britain.

Perhaps the most obvious way for Great Britain to provide assistance to Maczek would have been to take the step that they did with so many other senior serving Poles and offer them a comfortable pension. At a time when the average British employee was earning in the region of £24 a month General Anders, the most political of the Polish military hierarchy and certainly the deepest thorn in the side of the allies with regards to his political anti soviet rhetoric was awarded £100 a month with many others receiving between this and £75.

What beggars belief is that Maczek, who commanded I Corps, was apolitical and whose prescience and planning had pulled the allies collective balls out of the fire in Normandy was awarded nothing! Not a penny!

Thankfully not all British are so disgraceful and this decision did indeed raise comments in official circles.

Bernard Law Montgomery in 1948
McGilvray quotes a note that Bernard Law Montgomery had written to the cabinet querying how their cases were to be dealt with and I think its worth quoting in full:"... General Maczek with the 1st Polish Armoured Division played a large part in the closing of the Falaise Gap.
b) These officers at PRC have aided Britain in assisting government policy and resettled their men into the British economy.
c) These men have lost everything they possessed. Kopanski and Maczek have been publicly deprived of their Polish nationality. The majority have spent their spare money in ensuring a good education for their children and as a consequence have saved little or nothing."




Another partisan to Maczeks cause said:

"... General Maczek had most loyally handled the problem of the resettlement of Poles in Scotland and the liquidation of the Polish commitment to Scottish Command. He fought gallantly under Field Marshal Montgomery's command throughout the 1944/45 campaign in France and who, since he has been running the PRC's commitment  in Scottish Command, has absolutely no money of his own, and has a wife and two children to educate, also an idiot child whom he has to maintain. He is most anxious to know whether any provision will be made for him. I cannot help feeling that it would be an injustice, after the service rendered to us, to leave this type of man to sink or swim on his own."


The author of this note, who was writing to the Prime Minister, Clemence Attlee considered that a pension should be provided for a Polish Officer IF:

a) Of the rank of Major General, its equivalent or above
b) Had served in the Polish Armed Forces under British command during the war
c) Had served in the PRC

Minutes recorded by one Barbara Green at the Ministry of Labour and National Service are also in print as agreeing with these perspectives.

1st Polish Armoured Division is demobilised
The end for Maczeks former Division, the Black Devils came on March 1947 when a discussion was held at HQ on BAOR (British Army on the Rhine) to decide when to demobilise the Division and transport those who wanted it back to the UK and into the ranks of PRC. It was finally settled that the 1st Polish Armoured Division would cease to be at 1 minute past midnight on 1st May 1947.

That was the end of the story for one hell of a Division. Resolute in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds, stubborn, aggressive and one that had served the allied cause to the highest expectation in both good times and bad, they had fought from the first day of the war right up until the last, suffering a series of catastrophic reverses across Europe before remodelling themselves and striding back the other way across Europe and dishing out emphatic wallopings as they went!

Maczeks immediate fate after demobilisation is that he never received a pension from the British government worth mentioning! At the age of 57, with no skills other than understanding the nature of waging combined arms mobile warfare, he had to go out into the British job market in order to support his family.

The Learmonth Hotel in Edinburgh. Now a Travel lodge.
A former NCO from Maczek's Division gave him a job and as ever, uncomplaining, Maczek rose early  in the morning and took a 30km bus journey to Edinburgh where he worked as a barman at the Learmonth Hotel. Maczek, being a naturally upbeat and optimistic person never let his personal circumstances get him down though and he still managed to find a smile for his patrons.






Life was a series of struggles for the Maczek family but he never complained and they never asked for help. An insignificant pension from the British government was provided but was so inconsequential that it served very little practical purpose within the household so he carried on working in the bar. Every time his veterans stopped by for a pint they would stand to attention in recognition of his rank.

16 Arden Street in Edinburgh. Mr Maczek's family home.
The details of how Maczeks life unfolded after this period now become considerably less dense. Once the PRC was disbanded and Maczek settled into the grim monotony of civilian life, with his resolute refusal to recognise the communist occupiers of his country it would seem that he became somewhat of an icon to the Polish expatriates who had opted to make Great Britain their home. It was certainly a far cry form his 20's when he studied philosophy and fought tooth and nail on the Italian Front.




His memoirs go no further than the end of the Second World War and morally he usually avoided the Polish predilection for meddling in political issues that split the Polish community so frequently. In point of fact, by refusing to involve himself in these areas he was to become quite a thorn in the side of the communist body politik for some time to come.

Mr Maczek in Breda in the '60's
We should all be thankful however that no matter how abhorrently our own government treated a man of Maczeks calibre, other countries of Europe were a lot more graceful in remembering him and his men. As McGilvray tells it Renata, Maczeks daughter, reminiscing on a visit to the Netherlands said that her father was feted wherever he travelled in the late 1940's and again in the 1960's was feted once more as he took the part of honoured guest when he and other veteran guests retraced their steps that they so bloodily took in 1944. In Axel there were 4 days of celebration whilst a street was renamed 'General Maczekstraat', in Ypres a metal tablet commemorating the actions of 1st Polish Armoured Division was also unveiled.

Mr Maczek became the titular head of the Polish expatriate community in Scotland. With his self imposed distance from the Polish Government in Exile (which incidentally was no longer recognised by any state in the world) Maczek was able to retain a dignity that was admirable and he was stalwart in his refusal to recognise the Polish puppet state, even when, under a more moderate form of communism his nationality was offered to be restored in an effort to rehabilitate the government with its people by appropriating past heroes.

He ignored these overtures still!

The Edinburgh Military Tattoo 1972
He remained loyal to 'his boys' who were by now all pensioners. A lifetime of loyalty and service. By the time Maczek was 80 even the British were finally remembering him. It ws announced that he was to be the guest of honour of the Commander of the Army during the Edinburgh Military Tattoo.

The Dutch, ever loyal to his memory, held a concert orchestra in honour of his 80th birthday.






The turn of a century was a big event for Maczek. Cards and notes from well wishers poured in from around the world with many young people from the Netherlands and Belgium found amongst the congratulatory messages, writing to him to express their gratitude for the freedom that he and his men had bestowed on their countries through the shedding of their blood so selflessly.

Lech Walesa, victorious in his own anti communist uprising
By the time Maczek turned 100 Poland had finally shuffled loose the communist yolk and new Polish President Lech Walesa made Maczek a full General and awarded him a pension.


Sadly Maczek was too frail to return home to Poland by this point in time and in any case his true home was now a part of the Ukraine but he had lived long enough to know that his beloved Poland had been freed from under the communist boot.


General Stanislaw Maczek 1944

Mr Stanislaw Maczek died on 11th December 1994 at the grand old age of 102, rightly mourned by the Poles, Dutch and Scots. His funeral was held in Edinburgh but he was laid to rest at Breda alongside his men at the site of perhaps his most poignant victory.

His legacy to the majority of those who choose to remember him will doubtless be one of military exploits, struggle and victories against the odds but this would be to forget his humanity. He was a man who cared more for the person than the victory. He had iron ethics which he never compromised and he gave a lifetime of service asking nothing in return. His towering sense of duty and responsibility saw him look after a disabled daughter without batting an eyelid for as long as was humanly possible with the same sense of duty that he shepherded his old soldiers. He never once turned his back on an old comrade and he held to his personal creed just long enough to see Poland become a true democracy and a sovereign nation once more.

This old warrior must have finally died in peace.

Men cast in his mould, and finished to his standard are few and far between. One or two in a generation are what makes the world turn and serve as icons that allow the rest of us to aim to be something greater than we are. We should respect their moral legacies and always seek to pay our dues to their memories.

Gone, but never forgotten. R.I.P Mr Stanislaw Maczek

Mr Maczeks grave situated with all of 'his boys' in Breda, Netherlands



Saturday, 12 August 2017

Stanislaw Maczek - Part 3 - Poland between the wars (1921-1939)



Well, the Polish Bolshevik war is over. We know, being armchair historians that peace reigns supreme in Poland for almost twenty years. The Miracle of the Vistula; the victory at the gates of Warsaw in August 1920, prevented the spread of Communism into Western Europe for a generation... and my, how Poland recognised that fact!

Polish crest of the 2nd Republic
In time, this victory and self-aggrandised political positioning, would become the main problem for Polish military and political doctrine and would eventually bleed through into their foreign policy, as well as ultimately leading to the destruction of the Polish 2nd Republic and as a reprisal, the NKVD's murder of over 5000 Polish officers at Katyn. This is the reason why serving troops such as my girlfriend’s grandfather (see previous blog about the Podhale Rifles) had to hide all of their medals that proved they served in this period.

The excavation of the murdered Polish officers at Katyn, 1943

Senior Polish officers and politicians, most especially, Marshal Pilsudski himself, would make stubborn, foolhardy and sometimes bloody minded decisions which doomed Poland to dictatorship, illegal rule and a division from their closest allies, ultimately resulting in the loss of statehood between 1926 and 1989.

Zaloga makes some very informed observations on the state of the Polish military throughout the interbellum. The armies of the Russo Polish war were both heavily reliant on cavalry. This resulted in a cavalry bias not being particularly in evidence and because of the fact both sides were heavily reliant on cavalry, it was the cavalry that were instrumental in a lot of the victories. Because of this fact, the cavalry was widely lauded and somewhat revered in Poland, with the inevitable knock on effect that the cavalry officers became heavily entrenched, demonstrating a marked resistance to change.

Change did come however when in 1934, the lance was retired as a front line weapon, although training with it did continue. It is perhaps of some interest, if the comparison with the German army is made, that the lance was only retired from German cavalry regiments in 1927 and that too was amidst furious objections. Showalter also makes the observation that in the 1920's the internal combustion engine was still a markedly primitive design, with early vehicles essentially being road bound. This led to the inevitable conclusion that in the underdeveloped Eastern European battlefields the cavalry still had an important place. According to Polish military doctrine it took three years to turn a man on a horse into a useful military asset.

Pilsudski inspecting his troops
Looking at the Polish army as a whole, it can be said that it was Pilsudski's pride and joy! What’s more, the Polish nation made the direct connection between their troops and their subsequent independence and would therefore spare no expense in its upkeep, allocating a larger percentage national budget than any other European country. The problem here of course, is that Poland was and still is a relatively poor country.  Their massive percentage arms expenditure was still dwarfed by the industrial powerhouses of Germany and the Soviet Union during the '30's following Hitlers assumption of the Chancellorship and Stalin’s five year plans.

The 'lens' through which the Polish army of the Interbellum needs to be studied is of course, Pilsudski himself. He was not a professional soldier. He was an agitator and a politician with an assumed military position; and it showed. The Polish army demonstrated both his weaknesses and his strengths.

Polish Staff Officers
Higher Staff command skills and training was at best primitive and instituted an excessive reliance on 'improvisation'. This may have been worthy of concern during wartime, although perhaps understandable BUT as a fundamental training measure during peacetime, it would prove to be catastrophic. As Zaloga points out, the majority of the Polish high command of the interbellum had not fought on the Western Front during World War 1 and were therefore, uninformed on the need for mechanisation and resistant to the idea of introducing new technology in tanks, automobiles and planes. This meant that by the time war broke out in 1939, the Polish army was still organised along the same lines as the respective armies of 1914 that included the Poles within their ranks. 30 Infantry Divisions, 11 Cavalry Divisions (representing 10% of the Polish army) with very little motorisation and primitive signalling infrastructure whilst the majority of the artillery remained horse drawn, which was in line with alliances made with France. Recognition of the fact that Germany was re-arming was given during the '30's however, as in 1936 a commission was formed recommending that the Polish army should begin to modernise as a matter of urgency. A target was set for the implementation of 4 mechanised Cavalry Brigades by 1942, but by the end of 1939 there was only one, with a second in the process of formation and both equipped with obsolete junk. It was very much a case of too little too late and Maczek’s hard won concepts and ideas for mobile armoured warfare had clearly been ignored by the Polish leadership.

A Polish main battle tanks... ummm yeah, ok!

However, Maczek would have his day.

Maczek finished the Polish Bolshevik war as a Captain and two months after the signing of the peace treaties, he was sent to join the 20th Infantry Division as a Staff Officer. From 22nd January 1922 until 1930 he held the rank of Major which was backdated to 1st June 1919. A staff appraisal of Maczek from this period, talks about him in glowing terms saying that he was a conscientious officer with massive ambition and his relationship with his subordinates was model. He was extremely fit and had an ability to quickly orient himself in confused situations. He displayed admirable independence and was self-reliant. In modern terms he would be considered very much a self-starter.

Polish anti bolshevik propaganda poster
However, no matter how well Maczek’s career was going, by 1921 Poland was already exhibiting worrying signs. Poland’s most obvious problem was being sandwiched between two aggressive neighbours who had, until recently been at war both against each other and in one degree or another, against the Poles themselves. Following the First World War debacle and disasters Germany would inevitably be quiescent for a decade.  This meant that the main focus for defence was against current and hostile communist intent. When Hitler took over Germany and began extensive rearmaments, Poland acquired hostile camps on both sides. It should also be pointed out that despite Germany's crippled position through the twenties, they still remained very hostile towards the Polish state and plotted with the Soviets, even going so far as to resurrect their nascent armoured formations and Luftwaffe with the help of pitching camp in the Soviet Union. This entire situation was exacerbated by the fact that there were more than a few Western statesmen who did not even agree with the reformation of the Polish state.

The signing of the Treaty of Riga 1921
There is also a theory that at the Treaty of Riga in 1921 which settled the Polish Bolshevik War, the Soviet government tricked the Polish government into accepting more territory than it originally intended to take, in the belief that the more non Poles there were living under Polish rule, the more unstable the country would become. In fact, by 1930 Ukrainian hostility towards Polish rule was so enflamed that full on insurgency warfare was being waged, similar to that of the IRA against British rule. The Polish army undertook a pacification operation which was badly mishandled and saw the Polish troops rampage in Galicia.

It would be reasonable to assume that the incredible victories scored against the Soviets would serve to bind the Polish military together into a unity, but in fact the opposite happened. The Polish military descended into schism and factionalisation between the Pilsudski trained Legions and the professional troops from the former Empires. What’s more, the military developments that were available to Poland were hampered and somewhat suppressed by the military ignorance and illiteracy of Pilsudski and his cohorts, despite the Polish Soviet war being the largest conflict of the Interbellum up until 1936 and the Spanish Civil War. Lessons to be drawn were abounding. The mountain of publications disseminated by modern, professional and forward thinking officers such as Maczek went ignored, to their mounting frustration and resulted in Pilsudski, who practically WAS the army, preferring the company of his Legions not only politically but after 1921, also militarily.

Pilsudski and Legion Officers in Kielce
By ignoring the experiences of his professional troops who had fought all around Europe, Pilsudski divorced himself from his closest ally the French, along with their modern (although admittedly short-sighted) doctrine. The conclusion of the Franco-Polish alliance in 1921 led to the French reorganising the Polish army with the alliance stipulating that the Poles introduce 2 year conscription terms and that they maintain an army of 30 divisions modelled on that of the French army.

Typical Belarus grasslands
A word should be said from Marshal Pilsudski's position however. Part of the problem with the Alliance conditions was the inherent lack of mobility. Whilst this could perhaps be understood and agreed to when fighting Germany, given the experiences of the Western front, positional warfare when fighting the Bolsheviks across the wide open spaces on Poland’s Eastern borders was just not practical. There simply was not enough manpower to cover the space.

A further issue was that the civilian population of Poland was becoming wary of the power that Pilsudski held and to pre-empt this, they actively moderated the position of president when they drew up their constitution in 1921, a position that many assumed Pilsudski would occupy. Flying in the face of public opinion however, Pilsudski refused to take the position of a weakened presidency.

Gabriel Narutowicz
Despite his withdrawal from politics,  the Polish military was still the guiding light of the country and it was through Pilsudski and the military that the country’s first president, Gabriel Narutowicz found his way to election. The assassination of Narutowicz in 1922 made Pilsudski furious and he held the government morally responsible.  There is a theory that those who were responsible for the assassination were also working towards the death of Pilsudski himself.  In 1923, Pilsudski withdrew from public life  in disgust.

Between the years of 1918 and late 1923, Pilsudski had simultaneously held the offices of Head of State and Supreme Commander. He did not contest the weakened presidency in 1922, leaving it open for another to step in. As a result of this farce the Sejm (Polish Parliament) had to endure an adjusted relationship with the military. The period between 1921 and 1926 was characterised by the subjection of the military to civilian oversight, conducted partly through the office of the President as laid out in the 1921 Constitution. The President was not accountable to the Sejm, but his responsibilities were carried out by ministers who were. He was the highest ranked military officer although by constitutional decree, in times of war he was not allowed to be the supreme commander and was to work equally alongside the Cabinet, whilst the Minister of Defence would appoint a Commander in Chief. In short, the President was the head of the army, but its parliamentary dealings were all carried out by the Minister for War, an officer who was totally subservient to the Sejm for all military acts, both in wartime and peace. It is this interference in military matters that Pilsudski resented so deeply, which when you think about it is quite ironic. One military amateur resenting the interference of other military amateurs!

Sikorski as President
Between 1921 and 1926 Pilsudski was thwarted in his attempt to become the sole ruling authority in Poland, with successive Polish parliaments removing Pilsudskiites from positions of authority and replacing them with their opponents, both politically and militarily. It was during this period of true democracy that Maczek and his future sponsor, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, would meet. Sikorski's political career would begin at the same time as he was nominated to be Chief of the General Staff. Sikorski served Pilsudski faithfully in this role, but after the assassination of Narutowicz and then Sikorski’s appointment as Prime Minister, Pilsudski became embittered with the whole political process in Poland.

During 1923, Sikorski was nominated to the post of Inspector-General of Infantry and later also accepted the post of Minister of Military Affairs. It was during this period that the strategy of bringing the Polish civilians under the control of the military began to take shape. Pilsudski was furious and launched an anti-Sikorski propaganda campaign in a bid to gain public support as he sought to remove a political enemy, which is how he now perceived Sikorski. He thought highly of him as a military commander but politically, he felt that he couldn’t trust him as far as he could throw him.

Further exacerbating the political situation in Poland was the Sejm who were repeatedly ignoring the complaints and concerns of the ex-Legionnaires, causing them to nurse grudges against the Polish authorities and professional military officers, especially those of the former Austrian army. This is an important point here because Pilsudski always sided with these Legionnaires and chose them as his reference and support group instead of the army, so he would always be willing to take up their cause as his own.

Pilsudski in Warsaw executing his coup, 1926
Confronted by an ineffective civilian administration, still retaining the loyalty of many professional military officers, buoyed on by a tide of popular support from the Legions, and indeed the wider nation as a whole, Pilsudski launched his coup in May 1926 quickly assuming the reins of power. Indeed, there was widespread relief when he did claim power.

The streets of Warsaw at the time of the May Coup 1926
He justified it as a necessary measure to prevent the collapse of Poland into chaos. This was supported by the fact that the Polish military was the only authority that Polish civilians respected. Despite the fact that he claimed he was concerned about the Polish military becoming a tool for Polish politics, this is exactly what he used it for. Politics!  Once he assumed the dictatorship of Poland, military professionals were resigned to taking a back seat and the large number of ex-Austrian military professionals, along with the political enemies of Pilsudski, were purged from positions of any authority. After the coup, many junior officers would come to complain that they had been passed over for promotion for being on the wrong side, or to coin a phrase they were 'zmajowany' or 'May-ed!'


The investing of Belvedere Castle, Warsaw. May 1926
Of more critical importance however were the senior officers, including Sikorski, (a quite capable tactician and strategist in his own right and a modernizer), being placed into professional limbo, being neither purged nor yet involved in military life. Rothschild points out that, Pilsudski owed Sikorski a debt of gratitude for not allowing his Lwow regiments to become involved in the fighting at the time of the May coup in 1926, as Sikorski and his men remained aloof from the revolt. Direct support would have been preferable as it may have lent a veneer of respectability to the coup, and perhaps preserved the interwar Polish army from the amateurs that would eventually lead it to destruction.

Polish Legions on parade
These purges reversed the trend that had favoured career officers and saw the rise of political loyalists, especially those of the wartime legions. Some startling figures show that in 1920 only 10% of the officer corps were ex Legionnaires, whilst by 1939 the Infantry officer hierarchy (both active and reserve) was occupied by 75% of ex Legionnaires. Even the cavalry (including motorised) was 54% ex Legionnaires, as was the Inspector General, the Chief of the General Staff and his deputies and even the Minister and Deputy Minister for War.

A further damaging consequence of Pilsudski's rule was that by 1939 he was deciding on all appointments personally within the military, usually following Q&A sessions which he would lead at wargames conferences and events. This is just another indication of the amateurish apparatus of the Polish military during this period. By 1939 only 4.84% of the officers in the army were graduates of military staff colleges. Is it any wonder Poland suffered such a dramatic collapse in 1939 on the back of communications breakdown, lack of supply and poor distribution of military assets? Poland's individual serving troops could have been the best in the world but they still wouldn’t have been able to win a game of draughts when contending with this shambles!

The lack of formal military education within the officer corps between the wars was to prove disastrous in 1939. The politicisation of the officer corps at the expense of professionalism was to lead to a deeply riven factionalised army throughout the Second World War, a period when it would have served the state of Poland far better, by focusing on ways to combat the Nazi and Communist steamrollers that were riding roughshod over their homes and land. All of this however, was an arena that our erstwhile hero Maczek was always proud to remain aloof from.

Portrait of Pilsudski as virtual dictator of Poland
Pilsudski ruled Poland as a dictator from 1926 until his death in 1935, his rule becoming harsher with each passing year and most especially after the 1930 elections, which he and his supporters stole using intimidation and fraud. In 1935, the Pilsudski junta actually threw out the 1921 Constitution. They replaced it with the more autocratically and militarily friendly April 1935 Constitution which was tailor made for Pilsudski, although he died before he was able to enjoy it. That’s karma I guess eh?

The 1935 Constitution was to have serious future consequences for the State of Poland which Pilsudski and his cronies could not have anticipated (or at least, could only have anticipated if there were any serious geniuses at work for Pilsudski). Poland’s Government in Exile, after 1939, claimed its legitimacy from this 1935 Constitutional Document. In 1943, the Soviet government questioned the legitimacy of the Polish Government in Exile and their suitability to rule, claiming that the 1935 Constitution was illegal, thereby destroying the legitimacy of the Government in Exile in one fell swoop.  This was a measure that the Western allies were powerless to dispute, as one of the prime conditions of the re-establishment of the Polish state was that it existed as a democracy and NOT a dictatorship, which the Western powers were absolutely opposed to.

The signing of the April 1935 Constitution
Pilsudski’s death was a shock to the Poles and made more grievous by happening at a time when tensions across the entirety of Europe were just ramping up. Within Poland, there was a resultant state of political unrest. There had been little to no consideration to a successor once Pilsudski shuffled loose his mortal coil. They knew of nobody who could replace him.

Anthony Eden
 Serious consideration should have been given to this in 1931 when Pilsudski suffered a serious bout of illness and realised he was dying. He was in fact falling victim to cancer. The visiting British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden (my God! This guy gets everywhere. This guy is a REAL unsung hero in British history. Did you know he single handedly stopped the 1st Indochina War being turned into a nuclear war by Eisenhower and CF Dulles? What a DUDE!!!), after meeting Pilsudski on 2nd April 1935, reported that he appeared to be senile. As Evan McGilvray states; 'Despite his being associated with the resurrection of Polish independence and its preservation, he failed to consolidate his rule. Indeed after his death the sham of his regime was exposed'.

After Pilsudski's death, the actions of the Polish military under the auspices of Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly and Colonel Jozef Beck became overtly political. Colonel Jozef Beck, Poland’s Foreign Minister, was already well known as a favourite of Pilsudski, but Rydz-Smigly was an unknown until he was touted as a successor to Pilsudski. Until this time he was considered to be apolitical. It may be assumed that his appointment was, in part, a measure to settle the tensions between the professionals and the Legionnaires in both military and political circles. Rydz-Smigly was born in the Austrian partition of Poland and had joined the Strzeleczy early on. In 1910 he was conscripted into the Austrian army.

Kazimierz Sosnkowski in 1926 at the time
of Pilsudski's coup
He completed Officer training in 1912 leaving the academy with good grades, and despite his professional military background, his support of Pilsudski's coup ensured that his military career prospered. Many had assumed that General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, who had shared a German prison cell with Pilsudski between 1917 and 1918, would have succeeded Pilsudski but he failed to support the coup leaving him in the doldrums.

As with Pilsudski, Rydz-Smigly was neither Head of State nor Prime Minister but as head of the Polish Army, he expected all to bend to his will. It is at this point that professional British Military opinions start to reveal the depth of decrepitude prevalent in the Polish military apparatus. General Edmund Ironside, who led the British military mission to Warsaw in summer 1939, made a note of the fact that both President and Prime Minister were subservient to the military and most definitely knew their place! "The president is a figurehead...and knows it. The prime minister never appeared. The two men who had all of the power in their hands are the Foreign Minister; Colonel Jozef Beck and the Marshal Rydz-Smigly"

General Kazimierz Sosnkowski in 1943
At this point, it is also worth making an observation. This treatise has spent time criticising the amateur legions when compared with the progressive and professional nature of professional officers, leading to a conclusion that all Legionnaires were bad and all professionals were good. This is of course a heavy generalisation, brought into sharp focus, when one compares the military and political abilities of Rydz-Smigly (a professional) against Sikorski (a Legionnaire). Rydz-Smigly's incompetent strategy and marginalisation of opponents such as Sikorski (and to some degree Sosnkowski), would prove catastrophic in the first week of the Second World War. Poland, as a shattered nation state can count itself extremely fortunate to have had such capable and dedicated officers such as Sikorski and Sosnkowski, without whom Poland may very well have been consigned to the ashes of history. Sikorski, Sosnkowski and others like them kept the dream of Poland alive for two generations!

Polish troops swearing allegiance to the flag!
Not only was Poland’s political spheres dominated by Pilsudskiites after his death, but also the military and its future development was still held in thrall to the memory of the Marshal. In 1935 Germany was most definitely rearming, whereas the Polish military was still horse reliant and backward looking, with no appreciable changes having been made in the 15 years since the victory at Warsaw. It was only in 1938 that the General Staff ordered exercises, based on the real material capabilities of the forces and not its theoretical status. By this time it should also be noted that poor foreign policy, illegal home rule and poor political and military choices in development, had ideologically positioned Poland very much in line with Nazi Germany which drove the wedge deeper between Poland and its allies.

Distribution of Army Groups under Plan Zachod (Plan West)
The main exercises carried out were done so with the idea of resisting the Soviet Union, represented by 'Plan W' (Wschod - East) which revealed a lack of ammunition available to the troops. Plan W was finally completed on 20th March 1939 whilst the plan for war against Germany, 'Plan Z' (Zachod - West) was not even started until 4th March 1939 once the political relationship with Germany had deteriorated beyond repair. Plan Z was defensive in nature with the time, place and nature of the attack being chosen by the enemy. There is a strong case to be argued that a handing over of initiative to this degree is criminal, especially when a military realises that it is outnumbered and therefore will never be able to force a numerical superiority at the point of conflict so surrendering the benefit of any force multipliers. Why they never took this into consideration, we may never know, but it says an awful lot about the stupidity of the men guiding Poland into its conflagration. By March 1939, Poland was surrounded from 3 sides by Nazi Germany (East Prussia, the German border itself and Slovakia) with the Soviet Union on the fourth.

Karski observes that in 1939, Poland had fewer military strategies designed and implemented than it did in 1925, the year preceding Pilsudski's coup d’état and despite 50% of Poland’s national budget being spent on the military between 1933 and 1939, it was simply not enough. According to German dates for the same period, they spent 30 times more than Poland on the Wehrmacht alone, not even touching on the nascent Waffen SS, the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine. Ironically, during the democratic era of 1921 to 1926 two military plans had been developed and established in case of war with either Germany or the Soviet Union. As Polonsky says ' by this time it was all rather too late'.

Polish and German Officers on exercise in Volhynia 1938
Despite establishing a proper arms industry complex after 1936, politically speaking, by this time Poland compounded its neglect of the military by aligning itself too closely with Nazi Germany. They failed to appreciate the true nature of the Nazi ideology and were far too focused on eyes east towards their traditional adversary, the Bolsheviks. This even went as far as positioning their war industries as far away from the Soviet Union as they could get them... on Germany's doorstep in Silesia. This total focus on the East was one of the many failings of the Pilsudski era, but more critically, it was one that was carried on by his successors.

Information Poster about
Polands occupation of
Zaolzie in 1938
Poland’s final act of cooperation with Nazi Germany was the annexation of the disputed territory of Teschen in Czechoslovakia during October 1938, when Nazi Germany dismembered the Czechoslovakian state. To quote Evan McGilvray "This was the nadir of the Polish Military regime and caused Poland to lose support in the West. Indeed, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office referred to Colonel Beck in his diary as a 'Brute', in reference to the Polish ultimatum to the Czechoslovak government".

The Polish annexation of Teschen (otherwise known as the Zaolzie Incident), was the first time since the Polish Bolshevik war that Maczek saw active service outside of Poland’s borders.


Stanislaw and Zofia on their wedding day
Since 1921, Maczek’s career had been quiet, almost quiescent, although his personal life was a little more active. On 22nd June 1928 he married Zofia Kurys, a descendent of a family deeply involved in the 1863 insurrection against Russian domination. They had two children in Poland, Renata who was born in 1929 and Andrzej born in 1934, who would eventually rise to become Dr Andrzej Maczek, a senior academic at the University of Sheffield. This little family were destined to follow Maczek into exile after the collapse of Poland in 1939. A third child, Magdalena was born in exile, sadly handicapped, although the Maczeks, as stoic as ever looked after her diligently and she outlived both her parents.

Colonel Stanislaw Maczek in 1934
His career in interwar Poland was slow but steady. On 22nd January 1922 he was promoted to Major and was involved in General Staff work as well as heading up the Intelligence division of the General Staff. On 30th October 1927 Maczek was promoted once more, this time to Lieutenant Colonel, making commander of 76th Infantry Regiment. This was followed by another command, the 81st King Stefan Bathory Rifles, stationed in Grodno.

As it turns out, the Zaolzie incident was a massive mistake on Poland's part.  During the Second World War it would rebound and hurt the Polish Government in Exile when Winston Churchill recalled it and condemned it. Even the surrendering Slovakian general predicted that very soon Poland would be surrendering her lands to Hitler. This proved to be the case and the whole incident of the occupation of Teschen proved to be an extremely foolish mistake compounded by the involvement of our hero in it.

Polish troops marching across the border of Teschen 1938
Being a professional soldier, Maczek could do nothing other than obey his orders and move into Czechoslovakia. This land grab was a disaster for Poland, even if they were right in claiming that Czechoslovakia had annexed the lands in question in 1919. Whilst Poland was absorbed with events on their eastern borders, the Polish foreign minister, Beck, lacked the wherewithal to realise that executing a land grab alongside Nazi Germany at a time when tensions in Europe were at the highest level since 1914, was a gross political blunder. It positioned the dictatorship of Poland as sycophants of Nazi Germany and wholly lost sympathy for Poland from its Western allies, a situation which continued throughout the war causing a multitude of complications.

Marshal Rydz-Smigly
One can only guess at the regimes decision to land grab during the Czechoslovakian crisis in 1938, but a suspicion suggests that it was done in the name of popularism.  The junta became ever more disconnected from the man in the street, whilst the country began to drift politically and economically. It may even have been done as an exercise to boost Rydz-Smigly's popularity on the home front.

Maczek was made the commander of the Polish 10th Motorised Cavalry Brigade at the end of October 1938 (following the disastrous field trials earlier that year under Colonel Adam Kicinski), arriving in Warsaw from Czestochowa to receive the appointment, after 18 years quiet service in various infantry regiments as well as the Staff college. For the previous four years, he had been 2iC of 7th Infantry Division.

True to form, Maczek began to read the latest military literature covering his new assets at a voracious rate, as well orienting himself with the political situation between various countries in Europe; especially Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union. He recognised the situation was grim and was bound to deteriorate further. Poland had already occupied Teschen in Zaolzie at the beginning of October and the 10BK was to be sent in to strengthen the claim.

The Black Brigade in Zaolzie 1938
It is around about this time that Maczeks affiliation with the Black Brigade begins. At the time of the Zaolzie incident the Black Brigade was under the command of Colonel Trzaska-Durska and the 10BK became a part of Independent Operational Group Silesia for the duration of the operation and was tasked with moving over the border and occupying the important railway junction town of Bohumin. This was achieved with no problem and the brigade remained in this area for six weeks parading themselves around, waving their banners to much applause from the ethnic Poles of the area.

Colonel Trzaska-Durska
At this point in time Colonel Trzaska-Durska was unceremoniously booted out of the brigade for several significant blunders occurring in the recent operation. Maczek was brought in to take over. He was well received as the men of the Brigade were well aware of his combat record. His new posting came with a warning however. The command echelons were so far singularly unimpressed with what a motorised brigade had to offer and the commander of IOG Silesia stated to Maczek that the Brigade “did not perform” during the previous manoeuvres and so if its effectiveness did not improve “the trials will have to be discontinued”

In the middle of October the brigade was moved back to Bielsko from where they would serve as the mobile reserve of IOG Silesia. Training of the troops with their new equipment began again in earnest.

The 121st Light Tank Company as a part of the Black Brigade
At the start of November the Brigade was used to secure further towns and villages in Slovakia which led to arguments with Slovakian army officers and an exchange of fire over the demarcation line between the two states. One of the 24th Uhlan officers became a casualty and the Slovaks withdrew.

On 1st December 1938 the 10th Motorised Cavalry Brigade was removed from Independent Operational Group Silesia and returned to its depots.

The 10th Motorised Cavalry Brigade was the only fully motorised asset in the Polish army, but Maczek's 'Flying Column' and 'Storm Battalion' of the 1920's were suddenly remembered in Warsaw after years of neglect. As war beckoned people started to remember Maczek!

General Sir Edmund Ironside
After March 1939, with Germany's absorption of the remainder of the Czechoslovakian state, Hitler turned his attention to Poland. Great Britain made promises to stand by Poland in the event of war, a rash act according to General Edmund Ironside, as there was very little that Great Britain could immediately achieve in a ground war as the British strength was in its navy. However, Poland was not alone in being politically outmanoeuvred, as both France and Great Britain were also flanked by the more aggressive German foreign policies of the 30's. The governments of France and Great Britain were simply not prepared for the depths of deception practised by Hitler, who was quite clear and outspoken in his intentions for Eastern Europe.

Western European statesmen were still blindly ignoring Hitler’s rhetoric, continuing in their French speaking, political twilight of Gentlemen’s diplomacy. Finally however, Hitler let slip the dogs of war and the face of Europe was changed forever...