Stanislaw Maczek - Part 5 - France and Great Britain (1940-1944)

Well, you guys may all think that the marathon is over after having read of the exploits of Maczek, the Black Brigade and their struggle across southern Poland but no, you would be wrong.

Already a veteran of 20 years, with more combat experience than you could shake a depleted uranium stick at, our comrade Stanislaw has only just begun the trials that would take him to the hallowed pantheon of the immortal worshipped!

The result of Poland's military implosion.

We join our hero in France on the 23rd October 1939, a mere two weeks after Poland finally recognises the fact she has militarily imploded... bowed but certainly not broken and once again champing at the bit!

Polish troops in a Hungarian internment camp

The ability to escape internment was common amongst the Poles after escaping across the border. Many were not only able to get away but more incredibly, the majority received hospitality whilst on the run, notably from Yugoslavian and Polish diplomatic staff. What is perhaps most incredible is that Maczek, in the civilian clothing that he had donned was able to travel with his wife and two children (who had precipitately joined him in Hungary) out of Hungary and on to France. It was most unlikely that an escaped foreign officer would have been travelling with his wife and two young children and he did not look the part of a highly respected and therefore dangerous, military officer at large. Instead, he played the part of a diplomat with a small family travelling across Europe extremely convincingly.

It would seem that Maczek’s wife, Zofia, was also a bit on the smart side as Stanislaw seems to have seen the way the wind was blowing early on and sent a note to his wife to 'make arrangements'

A Polish refugee family arriving at the end of their journey

During the night of 21/22nd October 1939, Maczek travelled with his family from Hungary to Paris. At 10:00 he reported to the Polish military commander, General Wladyslaw Sikorski at the Regina Hotel. Maczek was warmly welcomed by him; they had known each other, you may recall from previous posts, since the 1920's. Sikorski was also aware of the bravery displayed by the Black Brigade through the desperate struggle in September and the invaluable leadership that Maczek had displayed through the fighting. He immediately promoted Maczek to the rank of Brigadier General and handed him the responsibility for training the troops in France. The Polish army would attempt to do its best impression of a Phoenix and, despite the obstacles, rise from the ashes of destruction.

For the Poles arriving in France following the evisceration of their country, the problems that they encountered were legion. These problems could be reduced to those of securing diplomatic recognition of a Polish government to be formed in exile and how best this government could continue to contribute Polish force of arms to the war effort, in a way that was more than mere symbolism.

Sikorski...

Sikorski may very well have had another reason for being thankful to see Maczek emerge from the ashes of Poland because of the nature of many of the other officers that were in the process of arriving from Poland. Before the outbreak of war, the majority of the commanders of large Polish formations had their roots in the amateur Pilsudskiite Legions. The lower ranks at this time were understandably showing a lot of bitterness towards the senior Polish military hierarchy, many of whom had clearly failed in their duties during the September Campaign and had fled Poland. They left the serving soldiers to clean up the mess, as the Nazis and the Communists set about dividing up their homes and families.

At his first officer briefing, Sikorski went to some pains to explain that "there was not, and nor could there ever be, any place for party politics or the politics of a clique in the Polish army" (kind of ironic given how he treated Rydz-Smigly, Stanchiewicz and others after the collapse of Poland). Therefore, it must have been with great relief that he greeted Maczek, an extremely talented and popular officer, who nailed his flag to the mast of not involving himself in politics of any kind.

Sikorski giving a speech to the newly
instituted Government in Exile

One of the main priorities at the time, was to establish a recognised government in exile (before either the Nazis or Soviets could establish a puppet government) that would be their mouth piece and still accepted by other nationalities. In fact this is what the Soviets did in 1943 by establishing the Lublin Committee, refuting the 1935 Constitution and dovetailing a load of Polish Communists into government positions as they communised the country. The real question was who should lead the new government given the fact that the old regime was so dishonoured and disrespected. The answer was obvious to the allies and most especially to the French who wanted their voice heard in Polish politics. They saw this as most likely happening through the appointment of General Sikorski, who had been in the political and military wilderness since 1926 and was seen as a capable political adversary of the great dictator. Despite being one of the most capable strategic thinkers in the Polish arsenal, owing to his opposition to Pilsudski, he was doomed to spend the interbellum cast aside as a reject from the outdated and outmoded inter war Polish army.

Whilst in the wilderness he had written modernist military treatises very much in the vein of Basil Liddel-Hart and Charles De Gaulle; his ideas being conspicuously ignored in Poland.  The French though were very much sitting up and taking notice of what was happening to him and were practically falling over themselves to ensure he was appointed to Prime Minister over an almost certainly average other political appointee.

Sikorski doing the rounds...

The problem here is that Sikorski's appointment, encouraged by the French, was to be little more than a figurehead for the Poles in exile to gather around and to ensure that there was somebody amenable to French interests running the show. They really had no more in mind for the Polish, which of course is where the problems began. None of the Poles would be happy to just sit there quiescent following the dismemberment of their homeland.

Another issue of course, was that after almost a decade and a half under a military dictatorship, and a track list of political and military decisions and actions that were very much in line with the Nazi party behaviours, the international community was a lot more suspicious of Polish agendas and motivations than the Poles would credit. The politicians that had actually escaped Poland and seemed to be waiting in the wings all seemed to be cut from this Naziesque cloth.

Jozef Beck

This anger that was directed by the Poles themselves towards the interwar regime certainly warrants attention because it was having practical effects on the relationships between the Polish themselves. Lieutenant Colonel Jan Kornaus, on arriving in Paris from Romania and reporting to Sikorski, stated categorically that he believed that the Foreign Minister, Jozef Beck was a menace to Polish interests and Romania should be encouraged to maintain his internment. Furthermore, the British ambassador to Warsaw, Sir Howard Kennard on meeting Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Minister on his return from Poland stated that "The Polish collapse and hasty retreat into Romania has caused significant resentment amongst representative Poles. The Marshal (Rydz-Smigly) and Colonel Beck are especially criticised and it is freely stated that the Polish people will not trust their future destiny to their former leaders".

Sikorski in particular, stood out to the French, going so far as to state in a  broadcast back to Poland that "he would rule out cult of personality in future government"

Polish French Monument at Camp Coetquidan 1940

From a purely military perspective this all sounded great. The Poles were desperate to shed any association with this self-destructive and inward looking political wrangling and instead, be seen purely as 'fighting Poles' who would simply not give up. When all is said and done, recognition should also be given to the fact that the Poles were never really aware of their status as a minor participant in the great events to come, being little more than a second string ally, always showing their hand and always demanding more than others were willing to give. Poland considered herself (and indeed she was) 'The First Ally'.  Sadly by 1944, Poland had been left behind to be occupied by the Soviet Union whilst Great Britain, America and others got on with the business of winning the war in the west, coming to view the Polish as an irritant and almost irrelevant to the war. However, in October of 1939 those days were far off and nobody was yet sure if the Nazi steamroller could be stopped. As predicted, Poland had been overrun in short order and it was now hoped that in the west things would settle down to a period of quiet before a protracted positional conflict would begin. This would prove to be wishful thinking.

Polish escapees from Poland arriving at Camp Coetquidan 1940

The immediate priority for the Poles of course, was to reform the army in exile.  This presented a problem as there was a widely recognised legacy of political interference in the armed forces to overcome, with almost every Polish officer having political opinions and being indoctrinated into an environment where historically, expression and interference based on these political views and positions was the norm. Maczek had continually proven himself above this, much to Sikorski's relief. Later on in the war, Sikorski made a habit of excluding or even imprisoning those officers who made a habit of politically motivated interference, leading to scandal as other governments claimed he was attempting to suppress his political enemies.

Maczek and Skibinski just after arriving in France...

At this time Sikorski's position was not considered secure, as General Kazimierz Sosnokowski was still unaccounted for. He was a senior officer to Sikorski and had fought an admirable defensive campaign in Southern Poland. As such his credentials were still untarnished, which led to a certain insecurity on the part of Sikorski.

Throughout the winter of 1939 and the spring of 1940, Sikorski attempted to familiarise the French military hierarchy with the lessons learnt by the Poles in September '39, but for the most part these lessons went unappreciated and unheeded. That is to say, unappreciated and unheeded by all but Maurice Gamelin, who sat up and paid close attention to the reports of the manner in which the Nazis were using close Air-Armour cooperation. Indeed, later on in 1940, Sosnkowski would write detailed reports of how the Polish army groups had had their fronts smashed by the Nazi use of aircraft and armour in close support. It is a matter of historical record that the interwar amateur military had relegated the Polish Airforce to that of a mere supporting service to the army, exacerbating the free hand that the German Luftwaffe had over the front line.

Maurice Gamelin

What is perhaps slightly more ambiguous is whether or not the French General Staff really understood the shock that the front lines were thrown into by these terror tactics.

On the 7th June 1940, half way through the French collapse, the American Ambassador to Paris wrote to the State Department that "Gamelin and his 'aristocratic' High Command had drawn no lessons from the German invasion of Poland and that the French treated the Poles with contempt". The French had concluded that these tactics would not have the same effect when faced with dug in French troops and the French army had therefore received no warning of what to expect or even any training. The results of this arrogance are well known.

Daily Mirrors front page just after the German invasion. Lord Gort's reaction...

The Condor Legion bombing Guernica in Spain '38

The defensive nature of French military thinking, at the time the preeminent military power in Europe, is well known and through the winter of 1939 the British Expeditionary Force under Lord Gort were busy digging in, extending the Maginot Line with the 'Gort Line' as it was called. In his memoirs, Maczek recalls speaking to French General Faure about the formation of a Polish armoured formation in October 1939 and being told that they would not be needed as the French had the Maginot Line. The British were no better in their outlook. Whilst digging their trenches the Secretary of State, Sir Kingsley Wood, was busy stamping his foot up and down over bomber command’s plans to bomb German private property... and that’s after Guernica in the Spanish Civil War was flattened by the German Condor Legion.  The majority of Polish cities being somewhat levelled had already provided ample demonstration that the Nazis were not singing from the same hymn sheet!

Picking up the pieces in Guernica after the Condor Legion flattened it

There was in fact, very little serious thought to cooperation between the UK and France in this period. The two countries failed to face up to the gravity of their situation and this continued until the joint expedition to Norway failed in such spectacular terms on account of the horrendous preparations and planning that went into the campaign. It was only after this complete mess that the two camps realised they needed to take their situations seriously.

Officers of the 10BK with wives enjoying a picnic in France 1940... perhaps not a 'serious' picnic!

The establishment of the Polish armed forces was difficult from the beginning. In January 1940 it was a question of basics. There were nowhere near enough uniforms to provide the Polish troops with. Yet another unexpected problem occurred in April, when the French government informed Sikorski that a percentage of incoming Polish emigrants would be retained by the French government to work in the coal mines  and those Poles already living within coal mining regions of France were to be exempt from conscription by the Poles as being too valuable to the mining efforts.

A Polish FT-17 at Camp Coetquidan

When Maczek arrived at the base allocated to the Poles at Coetquidan, he saw that the men lacked everything. Poles from across the globe were converging here and despite the tightening of the borders in eastern Europe, with Court Marshals of Polish interns attempting to escape becoming commonplace, the trickle continued. Various Poles who struggled across Europe to re-join the colours in France all say the same thing in their diaries. The French gave them nothing but a few old pieces of junk (World War 1 vintage FT-17 tanks) to train with and moved the camp from Coetquidan to St. Cecile in Avignon.

The French viewed them as somewhat of a pest and wanted to brush them under the carpet.

Brigadier General Stanislaw Maczek
in Camp Coetquidan

Maczek records that there were some courses provided for the Polish troops but they were the exception rather than the rule and all of the equipment was obsolete, with only enough eventually being provided to furnish a total of four tank battalions. It was becoming clear to the Poles that the French had reservations about the quality of the Poles and were refusing to take them seriously. This was a tough realisation for a man who had led his troops so adeptly against the Nazi blitzkrieg and against the elite Gebirgsjager to boot!

However, with the German invasion of the low countries and the extremely rapid Nazi success, the French opinion changed dramatically. In May, the Germans simultaneously attacked the French front lines from the north whilst German Panzer divisions led from the Somme and smashed their way up from the south via Avignon. The French, being totally unprepared for the speed of the German movements, were left in utter turmoil and confusion. This left the Poles hanging with their arses flapping in the wind as nobody had time to worry about them at this juncture. What especially concerned Maczek, and indeed other Polish commanders on the ground, was the nature in which the available Polish troops were being wasted; in penny packets across the front line.

The Polish 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade heading to the front

German blitzkreig sweeps across the Lowlands 1940

This was something that both Maczek and Sikorski were adamantly opposed to; indeed it highlighted the fact that the French were quite willing to throw the Poles on German guns, despite not having offered training or equipment to them for over 6 months. The Poles were sympathetic towards the French, understanding all too well what they were going through but were utterly opposed to the wastage of men and materiel that was happening. Sikorski had overestimated his influence in French circles and on lobbying for a delay, whilst the Polish armoured assets familiarised themselves with their new equipment, Marshal Petain categorically told him to order his troops to take the field.

Reality was starting to sink in and when the allies finally resorted to improvised strategies, they knew that France could not be saved.

Polish R-35 tanks in France 1940

Still not up to strength, Maczek reckoned he could have them ready within 7-10 days and the Brigade, now called the Polish 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade, was moved to a huge military depot just outside Paris. Here they were supplied with newer equipment (French R-35 tanks, just as the Polish 21st Armoured Battalion in Poland was equipped with) although still obsolete and given just a few days to familiarise themselves, on the condition that they enter the fray immediately.

The Germans launched their attack in this area on the 9th June and the Poles were thrown in!

Maczek realised that his force would not be capable of fighting with such unfamiliar equipment so he chose the best of his men, chiefly those who were with the Black Brigade in Poland and with them, entrained for the front.

Polish troops planning their movements

With the precipitous puncturing of the French front line, the Polish armour was mobilised and all eyes looked to Maczek to demonstrate how Polish armour would be deployed in the face of this new threat. The Poles were asked to screen the withdrawal of the French 4th Army under General Requin near Reims, as they fought their way backwards along the Avise-Moloy axis near Divon towards the Paris defences. Maczek had only been able to put together one tank battalion, two motorised cavalry squadrons, one anti-tank and one anti-aircraft battery, trusting that the rest of his troops would soon follow. Even so, it was not enough to hold back the full weight of the Nazi war machine and these problems were compounded by the weight of French civilian refugees, who had been worked up into a panicking frenzy by German propaganda blocking all of the roads. This was a task that was really more suited to an entire Motorised Armoured Group and not a single Brigade.

German troops taking cover behind a picket fence in France

Maczek’s men positioned themselves between the flank of Requin’s 20th Infantry Division and somewhere further out, the French 59th Infantry Division although this was out of immediate contact. Somewhere out to the right there was supposed to have been another French army but nobody was sure where. Sadly, it turned out that many of these dispositions seemed to have been in the French imagination as repeated attempts to reach these formations by the Poles resulted in handshakes with the Germans. This had the immediate practical effect of the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade being categorically unable to execute their orders, which was essentially to plug the gap between the two armies flanks but they couldn’t even determine where one of these armies was.

French troops fighting for every inch of ground. France 1940

Maczek determined that the only practical move he could make, given the deep incursions into French lines that the Germans were making, was to protect the flank and communication lines of the French 20th Infantry Division as it moved backwards.

As it fell back through the marshlands around St. Gond, there was a real danger of the division being enveloped and cut off by advancing German columns striking deeply towards Champoubert-Montigivroux. The Poles stepped up to the plate and were instrumental in facilitating the French escape from the noose as two squadrons of tanks (under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Zgorzelski) acting as a northern guard, went into action against the German panzer spearheads bringing them to a halt.

This short action by the Polish tankers had the effect of slowing the panzers progress for a period and subsequent reconnaissance work undertaken by the French 20th Infantry Division around the swamps of St. Gond discovered this. It was on account of this French reconnaissance work that Maczek’s troops were eventually able to find their way to Vichy France and ultimately to Great Britain to continue the fight.

Junkers Ju87 'Stuka's divebombing

The Poles had come out on top despite the shock of twice being caught up in an attack by flights of Ju87 Stukas, who bombed the length of two Polish tank battalions, the Polish anti-aircraft assets and the Polish staff who had been travelling in a couple of cars with the columns. The Polish AA shot down one of the Ju87's in short order and then obstinately continued to defend the remainder of the columns troops. The first Stuka schwerepunkt had unusually, caught Maczek by surprise, as his troops assembled in light woodland in preparation for battle which offered little cover from aerial observation.

Gathering his wits, Maczek moved on and joined the French infantry’s lines, which only served to confuse the local situation further, as the positions in the woods became ever more confused with vehicles having their forward movements retarded and blocked.

When collected together into a single formation the Polish tankers were in a good position to intimidate the attacking Germans. Whilst the crews were protected from the voluminous shrapnel bursts they were surrounded with, they still needed to find a position in which they would be somewhat protected from the heavier weapons, such as Ju87 attacks. The Poles lost one of their trucks carrying anti-tank ammunition to one such Stuka bomb. It went up like a Catherine Wheel on Bonfire Night with the exploding ammunition keeping everybody’s heads down for some time.

A destroyed French convoy in 1940

Polish recollections of the Stuka attacks state that the vertical and pinpoint nature of the attacks, backed up by the screaming sirens, made the attacks feel personal, almost as if each individual was being targeted on their own. The effect was stupefying! The dive bomber attacks frequently lasted for about an hour.

By this time the situation around the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade and the French 20th Infantry Division was starting to spiral. It was patently obvious that the war in mainland Europe was now lost and Maczek found it necessary to start considering how best to extricate his command, whilst at the same time not letting down his French allies by appearing to cut and run. In very trying circumstances, Maczek attempted to gain communication with local French formations and request orders and cooperation. Maczek and his staff, via the French communications officer that accompanied them, Colonel Duchon, received orders to concentrate the Brigade on the River Seine. The next 24 hours Maczek and his Brigade were in constant contact with XXIII Corps, after which the Brigade settled in with the French 2nd Infantry Division moving towards the Seine positions and on to the west. On reaching Bar-sur-Seine an intact bridge was discovered. Bombed by the Germans, they had failed to destroy it, so on the 15th June the Brigade crossed it and headed for a heavily forested area ahead of them to take cover.

Retreating French troops 1940

Not all of the French were willing to lie down and die however. The commander of the French 42nd Infantry Division was happy to indulge in tactical flights of fancy. Even so, Maczek was happy to see that some of the French still had fighting spirit and with a little moderation were happy to cooperate with him.

The news of the loss of Paris then reached them. Maczek still did not consider the possibility that the war was over. Even 42 eme ID commander agreed with the opinion that there was still a lot of France left unoccupied and the overseas colonies could have been seconded as a base of operations and perhaps a seat of government in exile. They sought for ways to turn the situation around seeking detailed instructions from Corps of where to go and what to do.

The 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade moved into the Forest of Chaource with the express purpose of getting their vehicles rearmed and refuelled; the problem being that their supply column no longer existed. Fuel was being irregularly received from depot supplies although with the speedy German advance even this tenuous supply arrangement had collapsed, with the unfortunate results that the Polish fuel reserves had been virtually finished. All attempts to locate alternative fuel sources revealed that they were either in German hands or else the scouts failed to return at all.

The Germans advance

Final orders were received from Corps headquarters that they were to operate as vanguard for the 20eme Division Infanterie and head towards Montbard. This required a reality check from the Poles as they were short on fuel, had an estimated 40 miles to cover and would be expected to overcome the Germans in a series of short skirmishes and battles. It just wasn’t possible. However, it was suggested that enough fuel could be recovered from enough of the vehicles to supply one strong column, with the consumables it needed to complete its task, so against the wishes of Colonel Duchon, everything was consolidated into the one column or else destroyed to prevent it falling into the hands of the enemy.

German troops launching an assault

The 10 Armoured Cavalry Brigade, now parsed down to a reinforced tank company, with two motorised cavalry squadrons, combat engineers plus attached anti-tank and anti-aircraft assets moved off to the west. After an entire two platoons of reconnaissance motorcycles were sent out and not seen again, they dispensed with scouting the way ahead and just bulldozed their way through the German positions reaching the Burgundy Canal.

From a distance French vehicles, both civilian and military, could be seen turning around and racing away from Montbard in an effort to escape the Germans who had already occupied the town. Captain Jean Borutra, the famous tennis ace, was in command of a withdrawing French battery. Bumping into Maczek, he informed him of the situation in Montbard, which allowed Maczek to form a plan of attack in order to push the Germans back out of the town.

An old postcard showing the bridge in Montbard that served as the Polish objective

By this point in time the Poles were little more than 'the dirty dozen'. Facing a numerically far superior foe, they were devoid of artillery and conventional wisdom dictated that tanks could not attack at night, nor operate safely or effectively in woodland or urban areas. Maczek however, disagreed! He felt that at this point they had nothing to lose and citing Warsaw, he felt that they had a score to settle with the Nazi aggressors. This was Maczek at his finest and he decided on an unconventional night attack.  By linking both squadrons and an armoured platoon and relying heavily on the element of surprise, (and perhaps most telling of his character) he was able to convince his men that all was not lost and that the foe were in for a whole world of pain!

Dispositions for the battle of Montbard, France. 13.VI.40 to 18.VI.40

As hoped, this surprise attack on the Germans shook them deeply. The Polish armour rushed up the road into Montbard with no casualties, taking the first outlying buildings of the town and linking up with the other Polish elements under the energetic commands of Majors Zgorzelski and Ejsysmont, ably supported by Lieutenants Niepokojczyski and Czarnecki.

French tanks advancing to contact

Working their way up a meandering road into Montbard they passed a flaming 88mm.  Most of the staff officers of the Brigade, Skibinski, Majewski, Stefaniwicz and Stankiewicz all took part in the attack, with the fire and fury being exchanged by tanks, artillery and grenades. Maczek recalled the fight as providing 'a parasol of bullets and shells' but the bottom line was that the Polish attack was so fierce that the Germans were left disoriented and the Poles were able to swiftly push them back towards the outskirts of the town.

Pushing deeper into the town and collecting prisoners as they went, they started to receive reports about an undamaged canal bridge, still currently in German hands but which provided an escape route for the Poles if captured.

Then everything fell apart...

A burning Polish R-35

A message was received from Corps headquarters that the French Division had changed its mind about coming to the assistance of the Poles and had instead turned south towards Dijon.  Then, the Germans were heard detonating explosives on the canal bridge destroying it in order to prevent it falling into Polish hands, which Maczek would in later years view as a great compliment to the Poles.

As it turned out, the panicky German demolition of the bridge was unsuccessful and fierce fighting once again broke out in the area of the bridge. The disparity of numbers between the two sides however, presented somewhat of a problem for the attacking Poles and Maczek once again had to consider his options. It was 02:00 on the morning of 17th June and Maczek thanked God that daybreak would not be far away.

German machine gun section advancing

Still determined to escape to the UK with his men, he wondered how he could get to the western side of the canal with so few troops and none of the required equipment, especially artillery, in the face of the enemy. Fortunately, that morning there was heavy fog and Maczek judged that there were just enough assets, time and coincidental environmental conditions for the Poles to launch one final feint. They withdrew to the forest to reorganise and prepare.

However, things were changing rapidly and no matter which direction the Poles considered along the canal valley, all that was found were German occupying forces. As a result the Poles also started to look at Dijon as a viable escape route. Lacking fuel and now being all but surrounded by the Nazis, Maczek ordered his men to destroy their equipment and attempt to escape to Dijon.

German convoys on the move

It was very soon realised that Dijon was already in the hands of the enemy, with the route into the town choked with German tanks and vehicles. From the north moving south however, the volume of German traffic was already diminishing, with some areas now being totally devoid of enemy, so these seemed to offer the best routes for escape.

By this time Maczek’s group had been reduced to about 500 men all carrying their own equipment on their backs. All heavy equipment was dispensed with and another German attack repulsed calmly, with Captain Neklaws even being able to secure a few prisoners for no Polish losses.

As McGilvray recounts "And so armed with a single Michelin Map and protected by a statue of Our Lady of Lourdes which Maczek’s wife had given to him, Maczek and his men set out in small groups headed to the unoccupied section of France (Vichy)”.

Columns of French prisoners marching into captivity

Travelling with Maczek once again were the indomitable Lieutenant Colonel Skibinski, Captain Stankiewicz, Lieutenant Bonvalet, a French Officer who had fallen into step with them and Maczek’s driver, Lance Sergeant Kopchanski.

It took 18 days of wandering, avoiding the Germans, dodging the occupation convoys, resting in woodland by day and crossing towns by night (including another period of separation and isolation for Maczek), before reuniting with his men before the entire group found themselves in Clermont-Ferrand in unoccupied France. Just as with the case in Hungary, Maczek immediately reported to the senior French military authority in the area, but realising that the Germans would insist on internment for the troops they knew that they must persist a little longer and attempt to make their own way to Great Britain.

Polish troops escape after the fall of France 1940

By this time, Maczek was a marked man. He was actively being sought by the German authorities and so he chose to head to Marseilles where it was known that there were opportunities for evacuation. Maczek however, seemed to have the poor luck of missing each and every boat that was leaving. Therefore, it became necessary for Maczek to leave France illegally. To this end, the Polish Consulate in Toulouse issued false papers to Maczek, enabling him to embark on a ship transporting demobbed Arabs back to Oran. From Algeria he crossed into French Morocco and from there embarked on a ship heading for Portugal.

In Portugal he received word that his family, still in France, were safe and assisted by the Polish Military attaché to Portugal, his friend Colonel Mally, another veteran of the Polish Soviet war. Maczek boarded a plane from Lisbon to London, eventually reaching Bristol on the 21st September 1940.

A new life was about to begin.

A typical Abwehr Brandenburger cell. 1940

It can be noted that by this time, there was at least one lesson that was taken seriously by the Poles who had survived the September '39 Campaign, but which was almost certainly overlooked by other nations; that was the effect that German 5th Columnists and Special Forces (the Brandenburgers) had caused behind the front lines at the same time as the invasion happened, all but paralysing communications and movements in many cases. Abwehr infiltration of the front lines in 1940 has been well documented and indeed, even in 1944 the infiltration behind the US front lines in the Bulge caused such pandemonium, that almost all of the American gains since D-Day were almost written off.  The Polish document which studied this was disseminated to the French General Staff although whether they read it or not is quite another matter entirely.

German troops advancing into Poland '39

It would seem that other than the Poles, the nationality who took the most lessons from the September Campaign was Germany. Their invasion took them twice as long as expected even with the Soviet invasion. Casualties were twice as high as expected and there was a hell of a lot more material losses than they could reasonably sustain invasion over invasion and as a result of this, their tactics were refined. The Air Armour cooperation was fine-tuned and when the invasion was launched the ferocity and speed were unparalleled in history.

Sikorski looking less than amused!

The icing on the cake for the Poles however, was when the French attempted to surrender the Poles to the Germans alongside themselves. Sikorski, much to his credit, all but had an apoplectic fit at the French General Staff who he demeaned as the "paralysed defeatism at the top of Frances military and political command!” To put it bluntly, Sikorski had made a huge blunder by the faith that he had put in the French military leadership and government who he had considered friends. It came as a rude awakening that he was viewed as nothing more than a minor ally and more especially, a bargaining chip for the French authorities to use over the table to pull their own necks out of the noose!

When Maczek arrived in Great Britain, we were in the midst of our own life or death struggle. The Battle of Britain, which stretched from the 10th July to the 31st October 1940 (the climax of the battle having been reached six days before Maczek’s arrival in the UK) resulted in the Germans losing 56 aircraft on the 15th September. The totality of this victory only became apparent in October when the Germans announced their plans to postpone their invasion in favour of easier pickings. This was actually abandonment. It was the first such abandonment made by the Nazis and it enabled the UK to stay in the war. It could, with some justification, be stated as the first major building block in eventually defeating the Nazis.

Things just as they should be!

However, when Maczek arrived we were in the middle of this battle and were fully expecting the Royal Navy to have been walloped and the Wehrmacht to land on our beaches at any time. Invasion fever gripped the British population. Churchill was forming his suicide guerrilla resistance cells up and down the country and Dads Army was desperate to stick it up 'em!

Churchill mid speech

Chamberlain’s self-deluded government had fallen and Churchill was very much a different man. A man of the hour, he was taciturn and realistic. Despite his fiery rhetoric he was no fool and he realised that the Germans were very close to having the ability to land, whenever and wherever they chose.

Great Britain needed allies and with the collapse of France, one of the most important allies available was the Poles. They had been arriving in Great Britain in large numbers and although they carried with them the reputation of being politically and militarily unreliable, they were forces that could be used... and more importantly trained!

Churchill & Sikorski

This impression of Polish troops can be gleaned from correspondence that Sikorski had with Churchill in November where the image of Sikorski, who held the office of Prime Minister and Minister for War, leading his troops into battle was seen as somewhat of a romantic image, but nonetheless one which caused the Western Allies to distrust the Poles. Civilian and Military authorities should never cross over and what’s more, the military should obey the civilian executive and not the other way around. Churchill was, if nothing else, a bit of a hypocrite, even having to be blackmailed into not landing with the troops in Normandy in 1944. BUT, no matter what the reality of him was, when he stood in the Commons and announced definitively that "War would be waged until victory!" this was the man to impress the Poles.

British and Polish propaganda poster 1939

The Poles in the UK however, were now presented with another problem. They wanted to carry on waging war, no problem there, and to return home victorious to a country with secure borders, but this is where the serious complications began. The Soviet Union was an ally of Great Britain and the guarantee of assistance only covered a German invasion so would therefore, refuse to take the Polish side against the U.S.S.R. This meant that the undeclared war between the Soviet Union and Poland would have to be continued through the Polish army in exile in order to return Poland to the Poles.

Raising manpower was proving to be a serious obstacle to Sikorski however. On attempting to gather Poles from the Americas to fight for the homeland, he found that very few were interested in joining up. The Polish 2nd Division, 12,000 strong, which had only lost 500 men fighting in France and had successfully crossed into Switzerland were interned, with the Swiss government having no intention of letting them out.

Dr I. Modelski

Manpower would be a problem that plagued the Poles for the rest of the war. A good insight into the model and development that the Polish army in exile was to take before their expected return to Poland, as a liberating army, can be inferred in Dr I. Modelski's 'Program of Ideology for the Upbringing of the Polish Army on Imperial British Territory' dated 14th October 1940. It laid out the following tenets:

i) The Polish Army was to represent the country as national heroes.

ii) The Polish Army should be a symbol of the honour of every Polish soldier and citizen.

iii) The Polish Army is a Christian army.

iv) The Polish Army fights for world freedom and democracy (ironically!).

v) The Polish Army is a cadre for a future Polish Army - Every soldier is a future commander and worth its weight in gold for the nation.

vi) The Polish Army presents itself as traditional knights, as in the cases of the Legions, the experiences of the 1920's, The September Campaign, The Campaign of 1940, Norway, France and the Battle of Britain.

Polish soldiers in the Scandinavian campaign 1940

As McGilvray argues, this model of Modelski's is worth closer attention as it was very symptomatic of everything that was wrong with the Polish military between the wars. It shows definitely, that the individuals guiding the ship had learnt nothing.

Polish propaganda poster 

The main problem was that this ideology set the Polish army up to be symbolic, the very act of which caused its senior officials to be both inward looking and backwards and yet brook no argument at all to the way in which it did things. It is a matter for healthy conjecture that Poland believed it was fighting for democracy when they hadn’t seen a democracy since 1926. The majority of the other points could also be called into dispute as to their truthfulness or usefulness as well.

In his monograph on Maczek, Szudek makes the observation that when Maczek arrived in Great Britain he was the most experienced commander of armour to be found on British shores. This is almost certainly the case, as the only other Allied armour commander who had had the opportunity to use a moderate amount of armour, Charles De Gaulle, was busy dodging the Nazis on mainland Europe and North Africa. What’s more, Great Britain had abandoned the majority of her equipment on the shores and fields of northern France. To put it bluntly, we were a country currently in dire straits with only 'The Few' holding back the Nazi avalanche.

Maczek talking with another Polish officer whilst in Scotland



Polish engineers constructing defences
in Scotland

Unfortunately, Maczek was to remain frustrated in the UK for the next 18 months with regards to designs he had on reforming any Armoured Brigade, as the defence of the French 3rd Republic had left Poland with a minuscule armoured force that was in possession of absolutely no equipment at all. This weak and tankless Brigade was sent north to Montrose, in Scotland, to defend the coast up to Dundee with Maczek’s headquarters situated in Forfar. This is where they remained, quiescent for the majority of 1941.

However, this air of frustrated inactivity was not to suggest that there were no events occurring within the Polish armed forces. As usual when they had nobody to fight, they resorted to internecine politically motivated strife. A military coup led by the President in Exile, Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz, occurred in

Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz on a Polish stamp

London where Sikorski was dismissed. Raczkiewicz considered that Sikorski held too much power and was determined to split the two positions of Prime Minister and Minister for War into two separate offices... and of course, the fact that Sikorski had opposed the post 1935 regime in Poland in which Raczkiewicz was a minor minister, technically made Sikorski an enemy.

Raczkiewicz appointed August Zalewski to the post of Prime Minister; a minister who had been closely associated with the totalitarian regime in Poland. Whilst he was attempting to form a Cabinet, on the evening of 18th July 1940, the Chief of Staff, Colonel Klimecki and two other senior officers arrived unannounced at the Polish embassy in Portland Place, London. Klimecki demanded that Zalewski renounce the ministerial position before Klimecki was forced to resort to any means necessary. As this was occurring, yet more armed officers were arriving; a perfect example of the Polish military interfering in civilian politics. Zalweski duly declined to form a government but was to remain influential until his death in 1972.

This episode did nothing at all to enhance the reputation of the Polish politicians and military.

Frank Roberts at work in the Foreign Office 1940

The British government was acutely aware of the events that were occurring within Polish political circles. They were remarkably sanguine over events, displaying a typically stiff upper lip knowing just what was at stake. Savery, in a note to Frank Roberts in the Foreign Office, complained about the "Mexican behaviour of certain high Polish officers" but little else was mentioned. Sikorski was back in office within 24 hours and within two days, Roberts noted in his diary "Savery rang, crisis over".

Simply another historical footnote.

The Foreign Office were however, aware of the power struggle between Sikorski and Raczkiewicz and were of the opinion that it was vitally important that Sikorski triumphed, as he was the man in control of the one useful asset the Poles still had; their armed forces!

Sikorski at his desk in London sometime in 1941

Whilst unsavoury, these events do reveal a plethora of facts when dealing with the Polish army in exile. The fact that Sikorski's supporters took control back for him, reappointing him, is a strong indication of power over legitimacy. However, it also directly shows that Sikorski had the moral support of the armed forces in exile who trusted him to lead them over any of the civilian politicians. It also indicates the strength of the Polish military in exile with regards to civilian matters. Frankly, none of the civilian politicians had any support from amongst the most powerful of the legitimate state organs that were still functioning; the army.

Stalin and Churchill in discussion

Sikorski was a political and military nobody in 1939, despite a life of service, but by 1943 he had gained such kudos amongst the allies that Winston Churchill mentioned to Stalin, who was attempting to have him removed, "If he should go, we should only get somebody worse!" and in some respects this could be taken to reveal that there was a real lack of serious political and military talent in the Polish forces in exile.

Polish troops marching

The British government duly ignored the events at Portland Place because quite simply, there were far bigger fish to fry and the government were far more interested in how many boots they could put on the ground to oppose German landings. They were far more interested in the size of the Polish contingent that could be roped into defending the beaches. At this time there were 14,000 Poles waiting to fight in Great Britain. However, there was still a deep legacy of distrust to overcome.

Even if Churchill was willing to stand shoulder to shoulder with Sikorski and the Poles in their respective hours of need, it should be underlined that the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax and the Minister of War, Anthony Eden, could not trust Sikorski as far as they could throw him (and looking at Eden’s career; that man was rarely if ever wrong about another person). They were both of the opinion that he was a Pilsudskiite and therefore undemocratic. What’s more, they were also of the opinion that he could not be relied upon to follow British orders, if and when they were deployed to assist when the Germans landed on the beaches.

Sikorski with his British Liaison Officer Victor Cazalet. Sadly
Cazelet would die with Sikorski in the Gibraltar plane crash

Eventually Victor Cazelet, the British Liaison Officer to Sikorski, was entrusted to make Sikorski aware, without offense, that he was expected to obey British orders in such a situation; a mission in which he was successful.

However, whilst all of this political wrangling was occurring in the south, the Poles in Scotland had a far more immediate and pressing problem; morale!

By July 1940, the Polish army had suffered two serious defeats, with the second seeing them ejected from the European mainland. They had been decimated 10 times over and finally forced to seek refuge in Great Britain. Finally, they found themselves living in tents in a cold and wet part of the country and being managed by politically suspect agitators at war with each other. To hammer the final nail in the coffin, when two of his loyalist officers begged him to visit his troops in Scotland to help restore their morale, Sikorski refused, as he was aware of the coup that was about to happen and he wanted to be present if it was attempted- which of course it was.

A typical camp in Scotland in 1941

When Sikorski finally made it to Scotland at the end of July, his reception was certainly not what one would have hoped. Major Perkins of British Military Intelligence commented that the atmosphere on General Sikorski's arrival was decidedly frigid, although over the three days he was there it improved and when he left Scotland he was reasonably popular.

Sikorski finally visiting his troops in Scotland. Not well received by his troops but he made solid ground by the time he left.

The way that Stanislaw Maczek set about dealing with and resolving this morale situation says a lot about his character. Prior to the formation of the Polish 1st Armoured Division, the time was not wasted by Maczek. He imposed rigorous programmes to train individuals in preparation for the day when Polish soldiers could once again, undertake their duties as a part of a future Polish armoured formation.

Polish troops training in Scotland 1941

Maczek’s training strategies and guiding principals were based on the pre-war Polish training system. Maczek always subscribed to the position that a Polish serving man was to be schooled in the spirit of being a servant of the nation. He must both serve it and give it protection. This was a principle that he later translocated onto the populations of Europe that he and his troops helped to liberate including the French, Belgians and Dutch. Maczek was a man who deeply subscribed to the gentlemanly code of conduct when waging war.

Camp scene of Polish serving soldiers in Scotland

A further example of Maczek’s standards being transposed down through the ranks was that on his arrival in Scotland, his orders and influence prevented the name of the Polish military being tarnished any further by demoralised drunken and lewd behaviour from the ranks. He restored the pride in the Polish military, he gave them something to do and targets to work towards. Polish morale improved as achieving these targets made them feel that they had a point to prove and that they could put the defeats of the previous twelve months behind them and move forwards.

The state of Polish soldiers that were being released
from Soviet camps was not encouraging when seen

The formation of a Polish Armoured Division was first seriously discussed in London on 7th November (my birthday by the way) 1941 and would force the Poles to face the reality that they were now to be organised and fight along British lines. It was reckoned that 10,000 troops from the Soviet Union would be required, in addition to those already in Great Britain. In late October 1941, Sikorski had outlined plans to Churchill to bring the Polish Army Corps in Poland up to the strength of a full Armoured Division, with two full strength Infantry Divisions having full capacity for independent action, but owing to a lack of necessary troops, Sikorski asked Churchill to attempt to secure in the region of 8,000 from the recently amnestied Poles in the Soviet Union. The Soviets had originally intended these Poles to be used as slave labour in the Far East and as such, Churchill skirted the issue until eventually, Sikorski settled for their release and relocation to the Middle East.

Churchill thanked Sikorski for allowing this throwing him a consolation prize, by informing him that there were plans to bring 5,500 Poles to the UK to assist in the formation of the 1st Armoured Division. Churchill noted that Sikorski was more than willing to break up the Polish 1st Armoured Brigade if necessary, in order to make up the necessary numbers for the formation of a full armoured division.

General Kazimierz Sosnkowski

General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, who would become Sikorski's military successor, was eventually forced to do just that in 1944 in order to allow the Polish 1st Armoured Division to participate in the invasion of Europe. Polish inclusion in these events was a massive, MASSIVE deal to the Poles. They saw their military as the most important show of Polish ability when they would eventually return to Poland.

In the meantime however, it remained to the ever practical and honest, Maczek to inform Sikorski that it was going to take more than gestures and National feeling to establish a Polish Armoured Division to the level that the British were demanding.

The British, on the whole, held negative views on the formation of the Polish armoured division. Opinions started off warmly in a meeting of British Officers, chaired by Major General Nye, in November 1941. It was recorded that a large number of the Poles in the UK had tank experience and over 600 of them had actually served in combat in tanks, so it could possibly be as little as 3 months before a division level armoured asset could be trained up and ready for combat.

General Sir Alan Brooke and General Dill in 1941

However, this is tempered by a minute recorded on the 12th November 1941 observing that the Poles recently released from Soviet captivity, were in a very poor physical condition and would likely require a significant period of time to regain any semblance of fitness before they could be considered for active duty. General Alan Brooke, the Chief of the General Staff further doused enthusiasm in a letter to Churchill, as a result of a letter that Sikorski had sent to General Dill on the 28th October, expressing his desire to form a Polish Armoured Corps that would comprise a single Armoured Division and at least one mechanised brigade. Sikorski had enclosed a plan of how he saw this reaching fruition and posited a timetable with a completion date of summer 1942 as preparation for a meeting to actually discuss the factors affecting the formation of the Polish Armoured Division scheduled for 4th November 1941.

Churchill made a show of support to the Poles in this venture, even if Alan Brooke was opposed to the idea. Churchill was actually of the opinion that Alan Brooke was treating the Poles unfairly, although it should also be highlighted that the relationship between Churchill and General Brooke was never easy, with overtly threatening gestures over the narrow cabinet tables being a common occurrence between the two.

Brooke’s objections to the practicalities of building the armoured division however, failed to faze Sikorski either. Far from it, Sikorski in fact wrote a letter to Brooke pressing for equipment to be supplied to the Polish armed forces, even if they were already earmarked to be provided to the Soviet Union.

Polish Valentine Tanks

A note dated 7th February 1942 reveals that the Poles had only had 32 Valentine tanks and 21 Churchill tanks allocated to them and that there was no chance of this changing anytime soon.

Finally, a week before Sikorski gave the order for the 1st Polish Armoured Division to be established, he took the time to explain his plan to General Brooke. Sikorski informed him that Maczek was to take command of the division and that it was to comprise the 10th Cavalry Brigade (10BK), 16th Armoured Brigade, the Corps Reconnaissance Regiment and other auxiliary units. Through the primary period of formation Sikorski proposed to organise the divisional headquarters, two tank brigades, an armoured regiment, reconnaissance, artillery, signals and engineering units. All of these were to be formed at full strength whilst all other formations were to be instituted at cadre strength only for the time being.

The second period would begin with the expected arrival of troops from the Soviet Union when the division would be brought up to full strength, primarily being fulfilled by the establishment and population of the attached infantry battalions and support units.

Sikorski concluded by stating that if all went well, the division would be fully equipped and organised by September 1942. On the 16th February 1942, Brigadier General Stanislaw Maczek received orders from Sikorski to the effect that he was to form and command an armoured division in accordance with the British Order of Battle/ Tables of Organisation and Equipment for such a formation.

Maczek with Skibinski in Great Britain

Having been formed, supplied and hosted in the United Kingdom, as well as being designed around our own TO&E's, a strong argument could be made for the statement that the 1st Polish Armoured Division was born and bred in the UK. However, the one thing that was indisputably Polish was Maczek himself. A born leader of men, he was almost quite possibly the most experienced and highly respected armoured commander in Europe on the side of the allies at this time. It could also very much be argued that it was he that formed the core morals and ethical direction of this Division.

The three stooges...

The development of this division however was always destined to be a long hard slog. Despite the unequivocal support of the British Prime Minister, General Alan Brooke, with his somewhat more sanguine military perspective (which could one supposes be perceived as cynical and depressive), continued to be difficult and slow down the development of the Polish troops. Brooke demanded that he have his say in the development of the Division and what’s more, categorically refused to support the establishment of the division at the expense of other ongoing military projects, such as the supply of hardware to the Soviet Union in order to keep them in the war. The priority that the UK gave to the Soviet Union, later supported by the US dismayed the Poles who saw the Soviets solely as aggressors.

Even before Sikorski ordered Maczek to form the Division, General Brooke was sorting out his priorities and leaving Churchill in absolutely no doubt as to his position. Supply of armour to all British armoured divisions was to be completed by 1st October 1942 and only then could allocation of Cruiser tanks to the nascent Polish division be started. He believed that as the Poles had such large numbers of troops with tank experience that their training shouldn’t take too long.

NY times headlines when Hitler & Mussolini declared war...
ummm... yeah... that was smart!

With the American entry to the war as a result of Pearl Harbour and Hitler’s rash declaration of war against the States in support of his axis partner Japan, control of the direction of the war began to slip away from the British. The upside to this though, was the fast manufacturing and manpower capabilities of the United States to make good absolutely any losses that had been or would be suffered, and indeed, now the Poles knew that they would be well supplied in the future.

This loss of control was something that Churchill made note of to Brooke early in 1943 after the American North African Torch landings. Many Poles were taken prisoner, having been forced to fight for the Nazi's and the British government had requested repeatedly that they be turned over to them so that they could be recruited for the growing 1st Polish Armoured Division. Progress was slow, but at least the prisoners had been separated from the Germans.

However, progress was being made and it was reported that ‘the big task of forming an old model armoured division is being carried out by the Poles with enthusiasm and efficiency. Unit training with live ammunition had been in progress for some time in the Lammermuirs but when this Division is completely formed, say in three months’ time, they will require a more extensive training area’.

Polish Cruiser Mk VI Crusader III tanks in Scotland

By February 1943, the armoured units of the Division were training in England around Newmarket with their Crusader Mark VI tanks, whilst the remainder of the still understrength elements remained in Scotland. It was noted that the other assets still did not have the manpower to bring them up to establishment and that provisioning the Division with the new Sherman tanks would only likely serve to exacerbate the problem further. There was no pool of manpower to replace casualties.

It is noteworthy to reference the fact that by this time, the Poles understood that they would likely be unable to secure more replacements from captured German Ostruppen and that development of their old model division could not continue. It was also likely that they would need to reform the Division into the new model if they ever expected to book their place on the European adventure. Manpower was the perennial Polish problem.


Polish Churchill tanks training in Scotland

Equipment shortages were also a circumstance that continued to cause friction between the Polish and the British. As Brooke explained to Sikorski, there were complications encountered in all sorts of areas involving Polish troop location, training areas and supply of hardware. Whilst a load of Valentine tanks were earmarked for the Poles, he was no longer sure this was achievable whilst the lend lease convoys to the Soviet Union were in full flow. He suggested that Churchill tanks were supplied instead, with a changeover to lighter and faster tanks when they became available.

Maczek took command expecting to be in charge of developing the 10th Cavalry Brigade, the 16th Armoured Brigade, the Corps Reconnaissance Regiment and other auxiliary units. He estimated that he would need 3-4 months to fully establish and train these elements, whilst all of the other elements were to be established but would likely remain with skeleton crews until brought up to strength with manpower released from Soviet captivity. This should all have been completed by September 1942 but remained dependent on the manpower arriving from the Soviet Union.

Polish Valentines of the highly trained 16th Armoured Brigade

The British authorities however, were still pressing Sikorski as to why the Poles were still trying to form an old model division that had been categorically proven to be inadequate for service in the field based on reports coming back from North Africa. Sikorski as usual, gave a list of thinly disguised political motivations but backed them up with something a lot more credible. To form a new model division under the British model would mean disbanding the highly trained 16th Armoured Brigade and turning them into, at best, mediocre infantry which he believed would prove very damaging to morale.

Sikorski volunteered that he would be willing to reform the Polish 1st Armoured Division, but only into something that was unique and would satisfy Polish needs, although this would mean swapping divisional assets around between Italy, North Africa and the United Kingdom, all without their equipment, which he envisaged would be replaced once in theatre.

Vice Chief of the Imperial
General Staff Sir Archibald Nye

The problem for the Poles at this time was that the British couldn’t care less for Polish political motivations and Lieutenant General Nye, in a letter to the Polish military attaché in London, stated explicitly that this level of transportation between theatres was quite categorically, impossible. The debate dragged on; caused by the Poles demanding the facilitation of establishing two armoured forces which they could later use to re-enter Poland, whilst British high command were only interested in the formation of one Division which is what they needed to fight Nazi Germany.

Any excuse for a Monty portrait... right?

Following Sikmorski's death and the appointment of General Kazimierz Sosnkowski to the head of the Polish army, Montgomery wrote a letter to Sosnkowski expressing deep concern that Sosnkowski was intending to wait for Polish prisoners of war to be liberated from the Germans in Europe before completing the establishment of the Polish 1st Armoured Division. Montgomery wrote "I am sure that you will agree that it is unsound to take into battle against the Germans a division that is not properly organised and which has not got well trained reserves immediately available to replace battle wastage; such action would lead to no good results. Perhaps you will reconsider your decision? I had intended to move the division down to the Yorkshire training areas in April but there seems little point in doing so if it is not going to be properly organised for battle".

A Polish Valentine tank on Exercise SNAFFLE

The message finally sank in! The Polish cause was no longer of any relevance to the allies. They either conformed to what the allies wanted them to do or they would play no part in the liberation of Europe from the Nazis. Sosnkowski agreed to bring the 1st Polish Armoured Division up to strength at the expense of other Polish units in Scotland. It wasn’t all bad however. Sosnkowski also noted that the entire Polish army and its promotional system, needed overhauling to escape the demons of amateur military practises that continued to plague the Polish armed forces. This was all drummed home as a result of the three day SNAFFLE exercise where it was determined that even if the Polish armoured forces inflicted a hypothetical 75% casualty rate on their opponents, there was simply not enough organic infantry support, armoured car support, reconnaissance and artillery support or just about any other type of support to exploit and follow up the gains. The real fear was that even if the Poles turned out to be excellent tankers, they were not keeping up to date on modern practises.

Polish armour on Exercise RED LYNCH

August 1942 saw the training of the Polish tank crews begin using modern allied tactics at Exercise RED LYNCH with courses being progressively arranged after this. 1943 however, was a tough year for the Poles as they started to understand that what they wanted was not going to happen and in fact, the two main priorities for the allies were the interlinked campaign fronts of North Africa and the Soviet Union; the loss of either most likely leading to the loss of the other and resulting in a final Nazi victory.

Once Sosnkowski took over, the wrangling over reorganisation continued with proposal meeting counter proposal repeatedly. The bottom line was that so long as the Poles refused to move on the question of reorganisation to the British model, progress would be negligible. By June 1943 the deadlock had broken and progress was made.

In his Order for the Day on the 24th May 1943, Maczek informed his men (realising that they had been guests in Scotland for nearly three years) that in a fortnight’s time they were all going on manoeuvres in England. In Scotland, the Poles had learnt about British society and had got on well with the Scots people. Maczek emphasised that this attitude was to continue when they moved to England.

Maczek saw the move to an English training ground after lingering in Scotland for almost three years as a very positive step. It meant that the British military, despite their reservations concerning the Poles, were still considering using the Poles in battle, proving the fact that they still felt the Poles were worth training.

Lieutenant General Sir James Gammell

During 1943, as they continued to train and take part in various exercises in readiness for the invasion of Europe, the powers that be started to sit up and take note of their abilities and professionalism. Lieutenant General J.A.H Gammell, GOC Eastern Command made the comment that they "...had made an enormous step forward on the road to achieving combat readiness!"

However, time was now growing short and so too was allied patience. The allies’ attitudes towards Polish prevarication eventually wore thin. They bluntly put to the Polish command that 'they either form an armoured division of the new model or they would not be allowed to participate in the invasion of Europe'

Sosnkowski was forced into a corner. The very reason for the existence of the 1st Polish Armoured Division was to return to Europe and to take the fight back to the Germans. Reluctantly, Sosnkowski stripped all of the Polish regiments in Scotland, except the Polish Parachute Brigade, to their bones transferring everything he could into the 1st Polish Armoured Division to bring it up to its wartime establishment. He was able to inform 21st Army Group Command that by 1st October 1943, the Division would be reorganised to the British model and would be up to establishment, less 120 men.

The British accepted and the 1st Polish Armoured Division began to take its final shape before overseas deployment.

The Poles showing off exactly what manpower they did have

Manpower continued to plague the Division however and on returning to Scotland, training continued with the usual fall out of men due to injury and illness, although a small knock was taken when Sosnkowski had to withdraw 500 category D men who were unfit for active service. In a meeting with Montgomery in February 1944, Sosnkowski informed him that he still needed to find 510 men as replacements. What’s more, the anticipated 1,280 men that would be required for the second draft of replacements, could only be acquired once the Poles and allies liberated parts of northern Europe that were populated with Poles. At this time the Division only had 70% of its equipment establishment of armoured vehicles, 80% of transport vehicles, 60% of signals equipment and 40% of engineering equipment. Montgomery though, was happy with this situation saying that it was comparable to similar British divisions. He promised a visit and inspection which he duly did on the 13th March 1944.

Monty with Maczek on his visit to the Poles in Scotland

However, Montgomery didn’t make a good impression and the relationship between Montgomery and the Poles was frosty. His trademark loose fitting uniform was seen as somewhat scruffy which the Poles took as a sign of lack of respect and he managed to offend every Pole when he actually asked Maczek which language the Poles spoke amongst themselves; Russian or German? He commented that he had met a number of Poles who had fought against him in the desert under Romell (his spelling not mine!) BUT, what really got Polish backs up was when Sosnkowski refused to bring the Division up to full strength using the available reserves, he was immediately crushed by Monty who said that if they weren’t up to strength then he simply wouldn’t take them to Normandy! Sosnkowski immediately folded and wrote to Monty on 19th April 1944, "I have given orders to complete the Division at the expense of other Polish units in Scotland".

The 1st Polish Armoured Division would have its pound of flesh yet!

...and for today that is where we will leave Maczek and the nascent 1st Polish Armoured Division. In the next and penultimate part of our series on Stanislaw Maczek we join him as he joins the allies penned into the Normandy beachhead and learn how his ability to read terrain all but saves the allies war effort in Western Europe.

Sounds a little far fetched right?

Wait and see!